The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715Wakeman, Henry Offley
History
The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715
Wakeman, Henry Offley
Europe -- History -- 17th century
The agreement of the maritime powers and France with reference to
the disposition of the Spanish dominions after the death of Charles
II. was a great step towards the maintenance of the peace
of Europe, but it did not guarantee it. It was necessary to procure
the assent of the chief powers of Europe to the treaty before it was
certain that it could be enforced without bloodshed. Here Louis and
William found much less opposition than they had any reason to expect.
The duke of Lorraine raised no difficulties as to the exchange of his
duchy for the Milanese, the Pope and the republic of Venice agreed to
the treaty in June. Their adhesion was most important, for Venice held
the gates of the passes through the Alps to Austria, and the Pope
could block the way to the march of armies to and from Naples. Besides,
the opinion of the head of the Catholic world might not unreasonably do
much to induce the Spanish court to accept the treaty. Less difficulty
still was experienced in Germany. Prussia, now just become a kingdom,
signed the treaty in order to gain recognition of her new dignity,
the rest of the German princes signed as a protest against the recent
creation of the electorate of Hanover.
[Sidenote: =Opposition of Savoy.=]
By the autumn the adhesion of the king of Portugal left the king of
Spain, the Emperor, and the duke of Savoy the only important powers
of Europe which had not accepted the treaty. Victor Amadeus of Savoy
was playing the part traditional in his house. He knew that among
the projects present to the mind of Louis was that of exchanging the
kingdoms of Naples and Sicily for Savoy and Piedmont. Should war
eventually break out between France and Austria his alliance would be
of the utmost value to Louis, in enabling him to support the operations
of his fleet by the occupation of Milan. Should the Emperor wish to
convey his son secretly to Spain he would find the numerous ports of
Savoy the most available for his purpose. Convinced of his importance
he determined to bide his time and sell himself to the highest bidder.
Before long he found that he had miscalculated his chances and lost his
market. [Sidenote: =Opposition of the Emperor.=] The Emperor could
not bring himself to renounce one jot or tittle of the inheritance
which he claimed as his due. Though he received under the treaty far
more than he was likely to win by war, though the treaty might easily
be described as a diplomatic victory over his rival France, though he
had willingly concluded a partition treaty thirty-two years before,
which was less favourable than the present, though he knew not where to
turn for a florin or look for an ally, nevertheless with the patient
stubbornness characteristic of his race, he set himself to obstruct
the treaty by delay and defeat it by intrigue. Though he never gave a
definite refusal he never really for one moment intended to give an
acceptance. His hopes were bent upon obtaining a will in favour of the
archduke from Charles II.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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