The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715Wakeman, Henry Offley
History
The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715
Wakeman, Henry Offley
Europe -- History -- 17th century
his intrigue in Spain was maturing, his obvious course was so to manage
the negotiations for the Partition Treaty, as to give as little trouble
as possible to himself without exciting the suspicions of William. But
on the contrary his private correspondence with Tallard shows that he
continually gave himself infinite and unnecessary trouble. His mind
was fixed upon the possibilities of the negotiations. He sets out his
views at great length on every turn of the diplomatic game. It is he
who is continually urging haste, especially when the news of the king
of Spain’s health gets more unsatisfactory, the very time when, if he
was not in earnest, he might have rested upon his oars without danger.
He continued the policy of partition, after he knew that in consequence
of it Charles II. had made a will in favour of the Electoral
Prince, and that France had become very unpopular in Spain. He even
permitted Harcourt to leave Madrid months before Porto Carrero effected
his palace revolution, and when all probabilities pointed to a will in
favour of the archduke made at the dictation of the queen. Such conduct
would have been sheer folly had Louis not been actuated by honest
motives.
[Sidenote: =Consistent policy of Louis.=]
In the face of these facts can any one doubt that the negotiations
for the Partition Treaties were conducted by Louis in good faith? The
principles on which he acted, if not strictly honourable, were far
less dishonourable than it has been the fashion to assert. This policy
stands out clear in his private letters to Harcourt and to Tallard.
It is consistent throughout and intelligible. He never swerved from
the opinion that Europe would not permit him to acquire the whole
inheritance for his family. He never thought it probable that Charles
II. could be induced to make a will in favour of France.
Under these circumstances, his obvious policy was to prevent Austria
from gaining the whole inheritance, or so much of it as would threaten
the ascendency of France in Europe. The best, if not the only way
of securing this without involving Europe in war, was by means of
the old device of a partition treaty. But it was always possible, if
not probable, that the negotiations for a partition would fail, and
Louis accordingly left Harcourt free to act as he thought best in his
interests until the Partition Treaty was an accomplished fact. Directly
the treaty had been concluded, Harcourt was recalled, and placed at
the head of the army on the frontier. He was no longer wanted to push
the interests of France at the court of Charles II. The time
for diplomacy was over, that for action had come, and his services
were required to prevent the archduke from coming into Spain in
contravention of the treaty. But the unexpected happened. Louis found
himself the possessor of the whole inheritance, at a moment when his
knowledge of Europe told him that it was more than probable that he
could successfuly seize the prize without bloodshed. The temptation
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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