But to do it in dependence on mere brute force was political suicide. Without the armies of Tilly and Wallenstein the Edict of Restitution was a dead letter, with them it was a military revolution. By it the Emperor stood out to the world as the author of a religious and political revolution, the success of which depended entirely upon military despotism, and was without any moral basis whatever. Germany would not be revolutionised by such measures as these. CHAPTER V THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR FROM THE PEACE OF LÜBECK TO THE PEACE OF PRAGUE Difference between Wallenstein and the Emperor--Opposition of the League to Wallenstein--Dismissal of Wallenstein--Critical state of Protestantism in Germany--Condition of Sweden--Policy of Gustavus Adolphus--His wars with Denmark, Russia, and Poland--His interference in Germany and Alliance with France--The Campaign of 1631 and sack of Magdeburg--Alliance between Saxony and Sweden--Battle of Breitenfeld--Military successes and political difficulties of Gustavus--Wallenstein appointed dictator--Gustavus baffled by Wallenstein at Nuremburg--Battle of Lützen--The League of Heilbronn--The murder of Wallenstein--The battle of Nördlingen--The Peace of Prague--Policy of John George of Saxony. [Sidenote: =Difference of policy between Wallenstein and Ferdinand.=] The recklessness with which Ferdinand had undertaken to revolutionise Germany soon made itself apparent. To crush the political opposition of Denmark and the lower Saxon circle, he had had to call to his aid Wallenstein and his personal army. To carry out the far more difficult task of transferring from Protestants to Catholics large districts of north Germany, which had been for eighty or ninety years in the hands of Protestants, and of forcibly converting to his own religion thousands of Protestant Germans, he had but the same force upon which to rely. It was idle to think that the Edict of Restitution could be carried out without the help of soldiers. It was certain that Tilly and the troops of the League would not suffice to enforce the Edict and resist the threatened advance of Sweden. To whom could the Emperor turn except to Wallenstein and his 60,000 men? Yet it was just here that he was least sure of his ground. Wallenstein himself strongly disapproved of the policy of the Edict. It ran counter to the principle of religious equality upon which he had organised his own power. His army was the only place in Europe where Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists met on equal terms and served loyally one with another as comrades. To put an army organised on such a basis to the work of ousting Protestant clergy and superintending conversions would split it to its very foundations. More than that. It was no mere caprice which had led Wallenstein to make religious equality the basis of the organisation of his army. He believed strongly that it was the only possible basis for