It is not to be objected to the external institution of marriage that under its sanction the grossest of lusts are practiced in the name of virtue, and that the weightiest evils are the result. Such is not the fault of the institution, but of those who use it for that purpose; and were it not for the institution, under the present lustful condition of society, the same practice would become universal, and would be as respectable as it now is under the sanctions of wedlock. If the external institution does not restrain the exercise of lust between the parties thereof, it does render disreputable its exercise beyond, and thus exerts an influence for good to that extent. It does not make the comer thereunto perfect in his character; but it tends to restrain him in the exercise of his lust toward others, and thus confines its evils to a narrower sphere. One of the greatest moral benefits of the legal institution of marriage is that it tends to restrict the lustful practices of the parties to themselves; and, in reality, this is the bondage of which the objector complains. The advocate of that which is called “free love” complains that under the legal institution of marriage the parties are prohibited from following their attractions or passional affinities; that although they might have been suited to each other at the time of the union, that circumstances and tastes have changed; that love requires variety, and that in matters of love each ought to be at liberty to follow its leadings. The first great error into which the advocate of free love falls is in mistaking _lust_ for _love_. The doctrine that love changes is a fundamental error, and of itself demonstrates that the objector has mistaken _lust_ for love. The true impulse known as love has an immutable basis, and will be as constant as the relation and need through which and for which it became manifest. The nature of _hunger_ and _thirst_, as expressive of the needs of the body for food and drink, never changes; and the gratification incident to the proper supply of those needs never changes until abuse and disease have wrought their work. Man’s desire for particular kinds of food may change; but that has respect to lustful gratification rather than the supply of a real need. Remembering our definition of lust to be _a desire for self-gratification_, we shall find that this _change_ and _variety_ in food and drink looks more to the gratification of desires than to the fulfilling of needs, and therefore belongs to the class of lusts.