Though we speak of the Rebellion as an "insurrection," it has assumed such proportions that we are in a state of actual war. Nor does it make any difference that it is a _civil_ war. It has just been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, _that we have the same rights against the people and States in rebellion_, by the law of nations, that we should have against _alien enemies_. The property of non-combatants is liable to confiscation, as _enemies'_ property; and it makes no difference that some of them are _personally_ loyal. All the inhabitants of the Rebel States have the rights of _enemies_ only. The recent cases of the Brilliant, Hiawatha, and Amy Warwick settle this beyond all question. There was some difference of opinion among the judges, but only on the question whether this condition _preceded_ the Act of Congress of July, 1861,--a majority holding that it did, commencing with the proclamation of the blockade. So that it cannot be denied that we may treat the Rebel States as _enemies_, and adopt all measures against them _which any belligerents engaged in a just war may adopt_. And no principle of the law of nations is more universally admitted than this,--that the party in the right, after the war is commenced, may continue to carry it on until the enemy shall submit to such terms as will be a sufficient indemnity for all the losses and expenses caused by it, _and will prevent another war in the future_. And to this end he may conquer and hold in subjection people and territory, until such terms are submitted to. And until then, the state of war continues. The right to impose such terms as will _secure peace in the future_ is one of the fundamental principles of international law. "Of the absolute international rights of States," says Mr. Wheaton, "one of the most essential and important, and that which lies at the foundation of all the rest, is _the right of self-preservation_. This right necessarily involves all other incidental rights which are essential as means to give effect to the principal end." "The end of a just war," says Vattel, "is to avenge, _or prevent_, injury." "If _the safety of the State_ lies at stake, our precaution and foresight cannot be extended too far. Must we delay to arrest our ruin until it has become inevitable?" "Where the end is lawful, he who has the right to pursue that end has, of course, a right to employ all the means necessary for its attainment." "When the conqueror has totally subdued a nation, he undoubtedly may, in the first place, do himself justice respecting the object which had given rise to the war, and indemnify himself for the expenses and damages sustained by it; he may, according to the exigency of the case, subject the nation to punishment by way of example; and he may, _if prudence require it, render her incapable of doing mischief with the same ease in future_."