These are the principal reasons which oblige the Japanese to remain the devoted friends of the Chinese Empire, and at the same time the adversaries of Russia, who, they believe, wishes to absorb China, and thereby dominate, if not the whole, at least the north, of the Asiatic Continent, and which compel them to throw in their lot with England. This latter Power does not aim at the political annexation of China; she only wishes to obtain additional facilities for her commerce and concessions for public works, and has therefore no intention whatever of surrounding the Celestial Empire by a formidable ring of Custom-houses. Undoubtedly Japan has had good reason to seek an alliance with England, and we need not be surprised at her distrust of Russia, which, having deprived her of the fruits of her continental conquests in 1895, three years later annexed them herself. As to England, her interest in obtaining the co-operation of Japan is so self-evident as only to need a passing allusion. Through her friendship with Japan she could obtain what she wants, not only in the Far East, but elsewhere, a large and well-organized army that, owing to an unquestionable supremacy on the sea, the result of the combination of two formidable fleets, could be easily and safely transported to the neighbouring continent. May there not, however, be certain other reasons which might eventually induce not so much Great Britain to break off her Japanese alliance as Japan to sever her side of the compact and ultimately extend her hand to Russia? There is ground for the belief that such a proposition does exist, since there are Russophiles at Tokio and Japanophiles at St. Petersburg. Is it not, moreover, rather imprudent to oppose the progress the Tsar’s Empire is making on the continent? It is, after all, an irresistible force resulting from the very nature of things, and therefore it were perchance wiser to be rather with Russia than against her. Then, again, it should be remembered that Russia displayed her goodwill towards Japan by leaving her a free hand in Korea, not, however, until after she had seized Port Arthur. True, the situation created in Korea by the compact of April, 1898, was precarious; and possibly, when once her position in the Far East is consolidated by the completion of the Trans-Siberian line, the Tsar’s Government may rescind the concession which it has signed and occupy the peninsula. But even if we admit that this contingency is a possible one—and it is by no means absolutely certain that Russia does entertain any such project—Japan may still hope for compensation elsewhere in the centre or south of China round the province of Fu-kien, where she has already made her influence felt, as also at Borneo. Russia might also give certain tariff guarantees, and might it not be to her interest, less urgently, perhaps, than in the case of England, to secure the co-operation of Japan in case