(2) Direct sympathy with another is limited to his sufferings, and is not immediately awakened by his well-being: the latter _per se_ leaves us indifferent. J. J. Rousseau in his _Émile_ (Bk. IV.) expresses the same view: "_Première maxime: il n'est pas dans le cœur humain, de se mettre à la place des gens, qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais seulement de ceux, qui sont plus à plaindre_,"[1] etc. The reason of this is that pain or suffering, which includes all want, privation, need, indeed every wish, is =positive=, and works =directly= on the consciousness. Whereas the nature of satisfaction, of enjoyment, of happiness, and the like, consists solely in the fact that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled: whence their effect is =negative=. We thus see why need or desire is the condition of every pleasure. Plato understood this well enough, and only excepted sweet odours, and intellectual enjoyment. (_De Rep.,_ IX., p. 264 sq., edit. Bipont.)[2] And Voltaire says: "_Il n'est pas de vrais plaisirs, qu'avec de vrais besoins_."[3] Pain, then, is =positive=, and makes itself known by itself: satisfaction or pleasure is =negative=--simply the removal of the former. This principle explains the fact that only the suffering, the want, the danger, the helplessness of another awakens our sympathy directly and as such. The lucky or contented man, =as such=, leaves us indifferent--in reality because his state is negative; he is without pain, indigence, or distress. We may of course take pleasure in the success, the well-being, the enjoyment of others: but if we do, it is a secondary pleasure, and caused by our having previously sorrowed over their sufferings and privations. Or else we share the joy and happiness of a man, not =as such=, but because, and in so far as, he is our child, father, friend, relation, servant, subject, etc. In a word, the good fortune, or pleasure of another, =purely as such=, does not arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly elicited by his misfortune, privation, or misery, =purely as such=. If even on =our own behalf= it is only suffering (under which must be reckoned all wants, needs, wishes, and even ennui) that stirs our activity; and if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence and lazy repose; why should it not be the same when others are concerned? For (as we have seen) our sympathy rests on an identification of ourselves with them. Indeed, the sight of success and enjoyment, =purely as such=, is very apt to raise the envy, to which every man is prone, and which has its place among the antimoral forces enumerated above.