If we look more closely at this process called Compassion, which we
have shown to be the primary ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once
that there are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering may
become directly my motive, that is, may urge me to do something, or
to leave it undone. The first degree of Compassion is seen when,
by counter-acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me from
bringing pain on another, and from becoming myself the cause of
trouble, which so far does not exist. The other higher degree is
manifested, when it works positively, and incites me to active help.
The distinction between the so-called duties of law and duties of
virtue, better described as justice and loving-kindness, which was
effected by Kant in such a forced and artificial manner, here results
entirely of itself; whence the correctness of the principle is
attested. It is the natural, unmistakable, and sharp separation between
negative and positive, between doing no harm, and helping. The terms in
common use--namely, "the duties of law," and "the duties of virtue,"
(the latter being also called "duties of love," or "imperfect duties,")
are in the first place faulty because they co-ordinate the _genus_
with the _species_; for justice is one of the virtues. And next, they
owe their origin to the mistake of giving a much too wide extension to
the idea "Duty"; which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In
place, therefore, of these duties I put two virtues; the one, justice,
and the other, loving-kindness; and I name them cardinal virtues,
since from them all others not only in fact proceed, but also may be
theoretically derived.... Both have their root in natural Compassion.
And this Compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness,
is an essential part of it, and does not depend on assumptions,
conceptions, religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education. On
the contrary, it is original and immediate, and lies in human nature
itself. It consequently remains unchanged under all circumstances, and
reveals itself in every land, and at all times. This is why appeal is
everywhere confidently made to it, as to something necessarily present
in every man; and it is never an attribute of the "strange gods." [1]
As he, who appears to be without compassion, is called inhuman; so
"humanity" is often used as its synonyme.
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