of our memory; and thus the lineaments of our character are depicted with ever greater clearness, and a true knowledge of ourselves is nearer attainment. And out of such knowledge there springs a sense of satisfaction, or dissatisfaction with ourselves, with that which we are, according as we have been ruled by Egoism, by Malice, or else by Compassion; in other words, according as the difference we have made between ourselves and others is greater or smaller. And when we look outside ourselves, it is by the same standard that we judge those about us; and we become acquainted with their character--less perfectly indeed--yet by the same empirical method as we employ with reference to our own. In this case our feelings take the form of praise, approval, respect, or, on the other hand, of reproach, displeasure, contempt, and they are the objective translation, so to say, of the subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction (the latter deepening perhaps into remorse), which arises in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves. Lastly, there is the evidence of language. We find certain constantly occurring forms of speech which bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the blame we cast upon others is in reality directed against their unchangeable character, touching but superficially what they do; that virtue and vice are practically, if tacitly, regarded as inherent unalterable qualities. The following are some of these expressions: _Jetzt sehe ich, wie du bist_! (Now I know your nature!) _In dir habe ich mich geirrt_. (I was mistaken in you.) "Now I see what you are!" _Voilà donc, comme tu es!_ (This, then, is what you are!) _So bin ich nicht!_ (I am not a person of that sort!) _Ich bin nicht der Mann, der fähig wäre, Sie zu hintergehen_. (I am not the man to impose upon you.) Also: _les âmes bien nées_ (persons well-born, _i.e._, noble-minded), the Spanish _bien nacido; εὐγενής_ (properly "well-born"), _εὐγένεια_ (properly "nobility of birth") used for "virtuous" and "virtue"; _generosioris animi amicus_ (a friend of lofty mind. _Generosus_: lit. "of noble birth"), etc. Reason is a necessary condition for conscience, but only because without the former a clear and connected recollection is impossible. From its very nature conscience does not speak till =after= the act; hence we talk of being arraigned before its =bar=. Strictly speaking, it is improper to say that conscience speaks =beforehand=; for it can only do so indirectly; that is, when the remembrance of particular cases in the past leads us, through reflection, to disapprove of some analogous course of action, while yet in embryo. Such is the ethical fact as delivered by consciousness. It forms of itself a metaphysical problem, which does not directly belong to the present question, but which will be touched on in the last part.