_daemon_, in the form of an =absolute Ought=, that speaks only in Categorical Imperatives, and, confronting his wishes and inclinations, claims to be the perpetual controller of his actions; in this figure we see no true portrait of human nature, or of our inner life; what we =do= discern is an artificial substitute for theological Morals, to which it stands in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one. Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the Kantian Ethics, like all anterior systems, is devoid of any sure foundation. As I showed at the outset, in my examination of its =imperative Form=, the structure is at bottom nothing but an inversion of theological Morals, cloaked in very abstract formulae of an apparently _a priori_ origin. That this disguise was most artificial and unrecognisable is the more certain, from the fact that Kant, in all good faith, was actually himself deceived by it, and really believed that he could establish, independently of all theology, and on the basis of pure intelligence _a priori_, those conceptions of the Law and of the hests of Duty, which obviously have no meaning except in =theological Ethics=; whereas I have sufficiently proved that with him they are destitute of all real foundation, and float loosely in mid air. However, the mask at length falls away in his own workshop, and theological Ethics stands forth unveiled, as witness his doctrine of the Highest Good, the Postulates of Practical Reason; and lastly, his Moral Theology. But this revelation freed neither Kant nor the public from their illusion as to the real state of things; on the contrary, both he and they rejoiced to see all those precepts, which hitherto had been sanctioned by Faith, now ratified and established by Ethics (although only _idealiter_, and for practical purposes). The truth is that they, in all sincerity, put the effect for the cause, and the cause for the effect, inasmuch as they failed to perceive that at the root of this system of Morals there lay, as absolutely necessary assumptions, however tacit and concealed, all the alleged consequences that had been drawn from it. At the end of this severe investigation, which must also have been tiring to my readers, perhaps I may be allowed, by way of diversion, to make a jesting, indeed frivolous comparison. I would liken Kant, in his self-mystification, to a man who at a ball has been flirting the whole evening with a masked beauty, in hopes of making a conquest; till at last, throwing off her disguise, she reveals herself--as his wife. [1] To keep the play of words in "_geschrobene," "verschrobene,"_ we may perhaps render them: "twisted ... mistwisted."--(_Translator._) [2] A contradiction in that which is added. A term applied to two ideas which cannot be brought into a thinkable relationship.--(_Translator._)