[3] A Chaṇḍāla (or Ćaṇḍāla) means one who is born of a Brahman woman by a Śūdra husband, such a union being an abomination. Hence it is a term applied to a low common person. Mlechcha (or Mleććha) means a foreigner; one who does not speak Sanskṛit, and is not subject to Hindu institutions. The transition from a "a barbarian" to a bad or wicked man, is easy.--(_Translator_.) [4] These so-called duties have been discussed in Chapter III. of this Part. [5] Juvenal, _Sat_. I. 30. [6] It appears that G. W. Block in his _Neue Grundlegung der Philosophie der Sitten_, 1802, was the first to make "Human Dignity" expressly and exclusively the foundation-stone of Ethics, which he then built up entirely on it. [7] _V_. Diogenes Laertius, _de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis, etc._, edit. O. Gabr. Cobet. Paris; Didot, 1862. In this edition the passage quoted is in chap. 105 _ad fin.,_, p. 182.--(_Translator_.) [8] They teach that "worth" is the equivalent value of a thing which has been tested, whatever an expert may fix that value to be; as, for instance, to take wheat in exchange for barley and a mule.--(_Translator._) CHAPTER VII. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE. The alleged Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, is manifestly very closely connected with Conscience, although essentially different from it in two respects. In the first place, the Categorical Imperative, as commanding, necessarily speaks =before= the act, whereas Conscience does not till afterwards. =Before= the act Conscience can at best only speak =indirectly=, that is, by means of reflection, which holds up to it the recollection of previous cases, in which similar acts after they were committed received its disapproval. It is on this that the etymology of the word =Gewissen= (Conscience) appears to me to rest, because =only what has already taken place is gewiss=[1] (certain). Undoubtedly, through external inducement and kindled emotion, or by reason of the internal discord of bad humour, impure, base thoughts, and evil desires rise up in all people, even in the best. But for these a man is not morally responsible, and need not load his conscience with them; since they only show what the genus _homo,_ not what the individual, who thinks them, would be capable of doing. Other motives, if not simultaneously, yet almost immediately, come into his consciousness, and confronting the unworthy inclinations prevent them from ever being crystallised into deeds; thus causing them to resemble the out-voted minority of an acting committee. By deeds alone each person gains an empirical knowledge no less of himself than of others, just as it is deeds alone that burden the conscience. For, unlike thoughts, these are not problematic; on the contrary, they are certain (_gewiss_), they are unchangeable, and are not only thought, but =known= (_gewusst_). The Latin _conscientia_,[2] and the Greek _συνείδησις_[3] have the same sense. Conscience is thus the =knowledge= that a man has about