The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to itBoyle, John, active 1867
History
The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to it
Boyle, John, active 1867
Ireland -- History -- War of 1689-1691
the fords on the river, but six pieces of light artillery and two
mortars. The wall of the English town was in a dilapidated condition,
and incapable of any protracted resistance. On the approach of General
Douglas, about ten months before, its suburbs had been given to the
flames by its governor, Colonel Grace, and the houses within the wall
levelled and left in the same condition as when the siege had been
abandoned. The Dublin Gate and its barriers were of great strength,
but another which opened towards the north, had been breached by the
artillery of Douglas, had undergone but slight repairs since that
time, and was incapable of offering a day's resistance to the immense
siege-train of de Ginckle. The present governor, Colonel Fitzgerald,
in pursuance of the plan which had proved so successful in the former
siege, had determined on the destruction of this section of the town,
when, contrary to the general advice, St. Ruth resolved on holding
both sections, and issued his command to that effect, as Ginckle
was about to move from Mullingar; and for this important service,
Fitzgerald had but 400 garrisoned troops, and a regiment of cavalry,
which came to his aid on the same day that he received notice of the
general's resolution. His position was therefore most critical and
embarrassing.--To abandon the English town without a defence, would be
contrary to the orders of his superior, and subject him to the gravest
military punishment; to withdraw his cavalry from the protection of the
river was inadmissible, as it would uncover the town on the north and
south, in case they should be cut off by a flank movement of the enemy,
and compel him to surrender without a blow. His only course was then to
make the best defence at all points: to dispatch a part of his garrison
to retard the enemy's advance, and gain time for the arrival of the
main army, which was known to be approaching, and within a day's march
of the town.
Fortunately, the country stretching towards the enemy was well adapted
to defensive measures, being such that a small body of resolute men
could throw great impediments in the way of an army like de Ginckle's,
encumbered with baggage and artillery, and arrayed in all the panoply
of war. An extensive sweep of marsh and bog lay to the north, both
difficult and dangerous to infantry; to the south the country was
broken and irregular; and the road along which the enemy approached was
lined on either side with hedges and thickets, affording convenient
shelter at almost every step of the way.--Such was the country through
which the English army had to march, and determined to seize on every
advantage that could, even for a moment, retard it; the governor
dispatched about two hundred foot dragoons and grenadiers of his
garrison on their perilous adventure.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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