The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to itBoyle, John, active 1867
History
The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to it
Boyle, John, active 1867
Ireland -- History -- War of 1689-1691
Ginckle was greatly mortified at the failure of this last grand
movement. It was made in force; each of the divisions had fulfilled
its part of the programme. All the resources at his command had
been brought to support it, and yet a signal failure at all points,
and a serious loss of men, had been the consequence; and, as he had
determined beforehand that on its result his advance or retreat
should depend, he immediately called a council of war, to signify
his intention to retire, and try some other point of the river,
or open a defensive campaign on the ground already traversed. All
the propositions submitted at the previous council were taken up
and discussed: the continual failure of his plans; the spirit and
endurance of the enemy; the impossibility of remaining any longer in
a district stripped of forage and provender for several miles around.
The expenditure of ammunition, too, had already outrun his most
extravagant calculations. Bomb and ball had accomplished all that could
be effected, for both town and citadel were now reduced, and still the
enemy, so far from abandoning the place, had recently renewed their
defences, and should the river be crossed, were ready to offer battle
amid the ruins. Should he again attempt the passage, and succeed in
crossing, success was to be purchased, but at a great sacrifice. Should
he cross and not succeed, the total destruction of his army was more
than probable. Should he attempt to cross above or below this place, he
uncovered the capital, and the enemy would not fail to profit by the
advantage. The disadvantages of taking the defensive at the beginning
of the campaign, and the disgrace of retiring in the face of the foe
whom the soldiers had hitherto been taught to despise, would have a
ruinous effect on the spirit of his troops, raise that of the enemy,
and exert a powerful influence on the action of the French monarch.
Having canvassed the subject in all its bearings, he was himself in
favor of trying another ford above or below their present position,
where less difficulties were to be encountered, and submitted the
whole subject to the deliberation of the council. The debate was
long and earnest, and the majority supported the decision of the
General-in-Chief. The minority were against retiring, and they were
the ablest and most prominent of the generals:--Mackey and Wurtemberg,
Ruvigney and Tettau, urged another assault, and offered themselves to
head the soldiers in person, and be the first to cross the river. The
deliberation was long, and the matter remained undecided, when the
opinion of the majority was changed by one of those fortuitous events
which seem throughout this war to arise continually in favor of the
invader. Two officers who had deserted from the Irish army were at
this juncture brought before the council, and proffered most important
information. They represented the feeling of security that prevailed
in the Irish camp; the prevalent belief that the enemy would retire
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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