pieces, so directed as to throw a raking fire across the pass itself, a portion of the marsh, and the esplanade beyond it, to prevent the enemy's enlarging there; and the remaining four pieces were placed on his inner right, and directed over a portion of the marsh and the road leading up to Urrachree. But before his centre there were no cannon whatever; either because he deemed it less necessary, or that he wished to invite the enemy's infantry to cross, where he was sure to break them by repeated cavalry charges, and overwhelm them by his more agile infantry while recrossing the marsh in disorder. His line being quite an extended one for the number of troops under his control, he had no reserve of infantry, but a choice body of cavalry was held behind the north-western side of Kilcommodon, out of view of the enemy, within convenient support of his right, and actually but a rear line of his left, and extreme left at Aughrim. As the battle of Aughrim, together with deciding the fate of Ireland and the dynasty of the House of Stuart, had also an indirect bearing, of scarcely secondary import, on the military affairs of the continent, it has been a subject of much more critical comment than that ordinarily bestowed on military events; and the historians of each successive period, down to the present, have visited the disposition of St. Ruth's army with praise or animadversion, each, no doubt, in accordance with his own peculiar views of what should or should not have been done by a general. While all approve the selection of the ground, as manifesting a keen perception of what a defensive position should be, nearly all censure some one or other of the arrangements made for its defence. His design of letting the enemy cross at his centre and beating them afterwards; the placing of his cavalry reserve so far from his right; and his neglect of the Pass of Aughrim, which was by nature so defensible; have been the subject of severe criticism, and the whole plan, or that of allowing the enemy to cross at any point, has been compared by the Duke of Berwick, to a similar error of the celebrated Marshal Crequi, which had been attended by a great disaster. But as the cavalry reserve had not been needed on the right during the action, and as all the enemy's forces which crossed at the centre had been successfully repulsed, the testimony of the duke, who was not on the ground, and of all who sustained that view, may be dismissed without comment. But what does really seem defective in his plan of defence, was the neglect of the Pass of Aughrim, which could have been rendered, with little labor, impregnable to either infantry or cavalry; and in view of his very inferior artillery, this omission seems totally irreconcilable, excepting on the ground that he believed the force left for its defence entirely adequate, as indeed they should have been, had they looked in time to their appointments.