The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to itBoyle, John, active 1867
History
The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to it
Boyle, John, active 1867
Ireland -- History -- War of 1689-1691
Knowing, through his English agents, that the earliest possible
attention of the Prince of Orange would be directed to his affairs
in Ireland, King James was now making active preparations. While the
levies lately made were undergoing that hasty discipline which the duty
of the hour made obligatory, he sent Tyrconnell to the French court to
solicit the assistance so long promised, and so unaccountably delayed.
Men there were at his call for any purpose, and to any amount, but he
lacked money, small-arms, artillery--in short, every thing that could
render their service available. Through the exertions of Tyrconnell, a
French contingent was immediately put in readiness, and, towards the
end of April, a force of six thousand men, with a park of artillery,
consisting of ten pieces, under the command of the Duc de Lausun,
arrived in Ireland. But this was the extent of the French king's
bounty, for the money, clothing, provisions and arms, on which James
had calculated so long, and which alone could enable him to put the
requisite number of troops into the field, were still withheld. Had
the troops now sent been of the regular French army, and given in good
faith, they would have been a great acquisition to King James. But the
French king did not allow his generosity to outrun his discretion. He
was then engaged in a war with the allies, which severely taxed the
population of his own kingdom, and so the troops sent to Ireland were
a heterogeneous body consisting of French Huguenots, Germans, and even
English Protestants, taken prisoners on the Continent, and offered
pardon on condition that they would serve under the standard of King
James. It is said that at least one-third of de Lausun's force was so
constituted, and of this, the number of desertions that took place
while they remained in Ireland, and the unwilling service performed by
the rest, would afford ample corroboration. Nor were the discordant
elements of which this force was composed, nor its want of devotion
to the Irish cause, nor the eccentricities of its general, the only
drawbacks consequent on this accession. Ireland had been represented,
as indeed it would seem to be, inexhaustible in men who wanted but
arms and discipline to become excellent soldiers. Louis wanted men
at the time, and, taking advantage of this information, stipulated
for an equivalent to the force which he sent over with de Lausun. On
the other hand, King James thought that he would engage the French
king and nation more earnestly in his cause, by the introduction of
French troops into Ireland, and, as a matter of course, the terms were
accepted. All things considered, it did not seem an unwise act, and
might even be an advantage to his cause, had he not been as poor a
diplomatist as he had lately proved himself a statesman. Any number of
armed men would have been better than the same number without arms; and
'tis said that it was optional with him to send his equivalent either
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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