The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to itBoyle, John, active 1867
History
The battle-fields of Ireland, from 1688 to 1691 : $b including Limerick and Athlone, Aughrim and the Boyne. Being an outline history of the Jacobite war in Ireland, and the causes which led to it
Boyle, John, active 1867
Ireland -- History -- War of 1689-1691
From the 16th to the 22d William was at Newry and James at Dundalk,
each awaiting the arrival of his artillery. While the main armies
stood thus, almost in sight of each other, several skirmishes occurred
between the pickets thrown forward on both sides, in one of which
Colonel Dempsey, with two companies of his own regiment, encountered
200 foot and 60 horse of the enemy, only six of whom escaped; but the
gallant colonel himself received a wound of which he died a few days
after. This incident raised the spirit of the troops to a high pitch,
and made them eager for a battle; and the king himself, much elated
by the event, determined to abide the enemy in his present position.
But the Irish leaders were not so favorably impressed, either with
the condition of the troops, or the position which they occupied,
and endeavored to dissuade the king from risking a battle under such
disadvantages. They again urged him to abandon the capital, and to fall
back on the defences of the Shannon, where, by instituting a desultory
system of warfare, he could keep William in check until the winter set
in, when, by the promised assistance from France, they could render
his campaign as inglorious as that of Schomberg had been in the last.
Every argument that could favor such a course was urged, and all the
circumstances by which he was surrounded seemed to point it out as
the best that could be adopted. A fleet was fitting out in France, of
which his earnest friend, M. de Seignelay, would have command; a few
days more would see it afloat, and on its way to destroy the fleet
and transports of William around the coast of Ireland: it would also
bring arms and ammunition in abundance, and by winter a powerful and
well-disciplined army would be ready to take the field. These and
many other arguments were urged, but all in vain. The king would not
relinquish the capital without striking a blow for it; he became all at
once as bold and intrepid as he had hitherto been weak and temporizing;
rejected their remonstrance, and determined to risk all on a single
battle.
This he tells in his memoirs, written several years later, and it is
but just that his reasons for disagreeing, which are not wanting in
plausibility, should be placed beside those of the generals. He held
that the loss of the capital would end whatever prestige his name had
with the French king; that it would entirely alienate the Protestants
of Ireland; that it would throw the provinces of Leinster and Munster
completely open to William, while he would be confined to one province,
the smallest and poorest in the kingdom; and that his final defeat,
though it might be protracted for a time, would be eventually certain.
But, whatever were the merits of the different views, is now but
speculation;--the king remained persistent.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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