The Battle of the MarnePerris, G. H. (George Herbert)
History
The Battle of the Marne
Perris, G. H. (George Herbert)
Marne, 1st Battle of the, France, 1914; World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- France
The French 3rd Army, when Sarrail took over its command from Ruffey
on August 30, was a thing of shreds and patches. The 42nd Division
of Sarrail’s own 6th Corps was being sent to Foch, leaving behind two
other divisions, and a brigade of a third which had been broken up. The
4th Corps was about to leave for Paris, to take part in the battle of
the Ourcq. There remained the 5th and the diminished 6th Corps, General
Paul Durand’s Group of Divisions of Reserve (67, 75, and 65), formerly
under Maunoury, the 72nd Reserve Division, forming part of the garrison
of Verdun, and the 7th Cavalry Division. Verdun depending directly
upon General Headquarters, Coutanceau and Heymann, the governor and
the divisionaire, were not subject to Sarrail’s orders; but they
co-operated admirably. Yet another southron, Sarrail was fifty-eight
years old, a tall, slight figure, with (at that time) short white
beard and moustache, blue eyes, and a gentle manner bespeaking the
scholar and thinker rather than the man of action he proved himself to
be. After service in Tunis and with the Foreign Legion, he had been
advanced by Generals André and Picquart, and rose by steady stages from
colonel in 1905 to corps commander. Across the mists of more painful
days, I recall the strong impression he made upon me when I first met
him at Verdun in December 1914.
From near the frontier, the 3rd Army had fallen back, at the end of
August, westward to the Meuse between Stenay and Vilosnes, leaving
the reserve group and garrison troops to make a thin line of defence
on the east of the river, just beyond the radius of the entrenched
camp and the edge of the Meuse Heights from Ornes to Vigneulles.
“Entrenched camp” is the conventional name; but there were no serious
entrenchments in those days, and scarcely any, as I can testify, three
months later. The forts and thickly-wooded hills were sufficient, with
the field army free, to determine the German Grand Staff to leave
Verdun, as it was leaving Paris, aside. The French, however, could yet
have no certainty on this score. During the first days of September,
the 5th and 6th Corps pivoted around the west of Verdun; and, when they
had completed the semicircle, the problem had to be faced. The hazard
of the old fortress was no mere matter of sentiment. Its fall would
mean the loss of all it could contribute to the contemplated attack on
the enemy’s flank, and of a great strength of artillery and munitions
that could not be removed, as well as of a formidable position. On the
other hand, there lay Joffre’s plan, and the reasoning that had saved
the British Army from internment at Maubeuge. The Generalissimo’s
orders were express: the 3rd Army must keep its liberty, and must,
accordingly, retire to the north of Bar-le-Duc, and possibly as far
as Joinville. It was not only Verdun, but his power of threatening
the German flank, that Sarrail hoped to save. He resolved, therefore,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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