[34] Miles, _Le General Maunoury_, Pages Actuelles, No. 49. [35] French, _1914_, ch. iv. The Hon. J. W. Fortescue (_Quarterly Review_, Oct. 1919), defending Smith-Dorrien, charges Lord French with “clumsy and ludicrous misstatements,” and questions the figures in the text. [36] _Meine Bericht zur Marneschlacht_ (Berlin: Scherl), notes, written in December 1914, on the operations of the II Army to the end of the battle of the Aisne. Bülow charges Kluck with not having informed German G.H.Q. of the gathering of Maunoury’s forces and the action of Proyart. For the battle of Guise, see Hanotaux, “La Bataille de Guise–St. Quentin,” _Rev. des Deux Mondes_, September 1, 1918. [37] For his report of a stormy interview with Lord Kitchener at the Embassy in Paris on September 1, see _1914_, ch. v. This account has, however, been strongly questioned by Mr. Asquith (speech at Newcastle, May 16, 1919), who says that Lord Kitchener did but convey the conclusions of the Cabinet, which had been “seriously disquieted” by Sir John French’s communications. [38] See _Foch_, by Réné Puaux, and, above all, Foch’s own works, _De la Conduite de la Guerre_ (3rd ed., 1915), _Les Principes de la Guerre_, 4th ed., 1917 (Paris: Berger-Levrault). [39] “I see no inconvenience,” Joffre replied, “in your turning back to-morrow, 28th, in order to affirm your success, and to show that the retreat is purely strategic; but on the 29th every one must be in retreat.” [40] For details of the last stages of the retreat and pursuit, see _La Marche sur Paris de l’Aile Droite Allemande_, by Count de Caix de Saint Aymour (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle); Gordon and Hamilton, _op. cit._; and _La Retraite de l’Armée Anglaise du 23 Août 1914_, by Ernest Renauld, _Renaissance_, November 25, 1916. On September 3, General Lanrezac was removed from the command of the French 5th Army——“because his views were contrary to a complete liaison with the British Army,” says M. Hanotaux (_Rev. des Deux Mondes_, March 1919); but this is a partial and inadequate statement. As we have seen, Lanrezac had been at issue with G.Q.G. from the beginning of the campaign. M. Hanotaux quotes a note sent to the Minister of War, M. Millerand, on September 3, by General Joffre, who, “finding that the rapid recoil of the British Army, effected too soon and too quickly, had prevented Maunoury’s Army from coming into action in good conditions, and had compromised Lanrezac’s left flank,” described his intention thus: “To prepare a new offensive in liaison with the British and with the garrison of Paris, and to choose the battlefield in such a way that, by utilising on certain parts of the front prepared defensive organisations, a numerical superiority could be assured in the zone chosen for the principal effort.”