General Bonnal concludes his criticism with a not very amiable homily on the insufficient training of the old British Army, and the inadequacy of its Staff work. Generals not trained as in France and Germany had, he says, a tendency “to practise the linear order,” to move their troops in deployed formation, supporting their flanks on neighbouring bodies, and taking a thousand precautions that lead to delay. That is why “the British Army, composed of officers and men full of strength, vigour, and energy, took more than two days to cover the 20 kilometres between the Grand Morin and the Marne, when, on the 6th, they ought to have marched on the nearest enemy.” For similar comments, see “La Bataille de la Marne, Recit Succinct,” by General Canonge (_Le Correspondant_, September 25 and October 10, 1917), with details of the battle. One sentence of M. Hanotaux is more to the point than all these criticisms and suppositions: “No doubt, if the encounter had not been produced, a little prematurely perhaps, in the region of St. Soupplets–Penchard, at noon on the 5th, the whole army of Von Kluck would have been south of the Marne in the evening; while Maunoury would have taken it in reverse on the north bank. Kluck would then have been closed in” (_Histoire_, ch. 38, p. 184). An interesting attempt to justify Gallieni against Joffre, and to challenge the latter’s strategy at this time, will be found in _La Genèse de la Bataille de la Marne_, by General H. Le Gros (Paris: Payot). He quotes Joffre as complaining to the Government (on Sept. 4) that Gallieni was seeking to “push him into a premature offensive.” SCENES AT FARTHEST SOUTH [60] Four days later, in the village inn at Pezarches, Madame, an upstanding woman of about thirty, told me of the following incident: