With the means at their disposal--those means were still great, though not great enough--the German Government had to choose between various alternatives. As to the choice they made, later events leave no doubt. They sent forward troops enough to _defend_ their flank between the Aisne and the Oise--it was all at the moment they could do; and they employed the best and heaviest of their masses of reserves partly to resist the British attack, but mainly to resist the 5th French army. At this time they had to let the position in the Argonne, round Verdun, and on the eastern frontier go; that is to say, they had there to remain for the time being on the defensive. The fighting north of the Aisne and round Rheims therefore crippled their operations at what were, in truth, the decisive points--the Allied flanks; and that was unavoidable, because unless the centre of their line remained secure, operations on the flanks would be impracticable. But these operations in the centre _used up their best troops_. Conversely, of course, the same operations left General Joffre the more free both to pursue his envelopment of the Germans on their flank northwards from the Aisne towards the Belgian frontier, and to go on with his seizures of positions round Verdun and on the eastern frontier, seizures which pressed upon and embarrassed the German communications, and consequently limited the total strength they could put into the field. It will be seen, therefore, that the fighting north of the Aisne and round Rheims _was_ important and _was_ decisive. The fact must not be lost sight of that the aim of the Germans was at this time, if they could, to re-seize the initiative. Again the fact ought to be kept in mind that the aim of the Allied strategy was not to drive the German armies from France, but both to prevent them from getting out of France and to destroy them as a military force. If we know the governing motive on each side, we hold the key to the strategy adopted. Here the governing motive of neither was a secret. To show the effect of governing motive, let us in the first instance follow the course of German strategy. We shall find that from the middle of September, during the succeeding nine weeks--that is, until about November 20--they made six great efforts, any one of which, had it succeeded, would once more have given them the initiative in this western campaign. The first was the effort to break the Allied line at Rheims. Foiled in their outflanking scheme by the inherent difficulties of the situation, but not less by the powerful Allied attack north of the Aisne and round Rheims, there can be no question that the German Headquarters Staff decided that their best, most direct, and most decisive stroke would be a counter-offensive made against Rheims with their utmost force, and as the situation stood at the end of September, there can be no question that they were right.