3. CHAPTER III. _Pursuits after a Battle._--A general who wins a battle must make every effort to obtain the greatest possible advantages from his victory; he must closely pursue the defeated enemy with cavalry, artillery, and infantry; he must spare no one until the retreat has been turned into a rout. Of the two sides, the vanquished are the more exhausted; and the effects of defeat are so demoralising that, when followed by pursuit, every vestige of organisation or power of resisting vanishes. Men whose backs are turned on a victorious enemy who is treading on their heels, harassing their flanks, and cutting them down or capturing them by thousands, will think of nothing but their personal safety. The more time that is left to the retreating force, the more rear-guard positions it will be able to take up, and every rear-guard action gives time for the retreat to be carried further and in greater security. A timid pursuit is almost worse than none. Every nerve must be strained to make the most of the situation. Yet, in history, how many instances are there in which pursuits have been carried out? What are the reasons which account for so many battles ending without a pursuit? There are few instances, indeed, where it has been possible for the victor to follow up his victory as is advised in the books. To mention the most noted cases:--The pursuit of the French after Waterloo; the pursuit after Jena; the cavalry advance on Cairo after Tel-el-Kebir; and, most recently, the battles of the Yalu and at Telissu, in the Russo-Japanese War. But how easy it is to recall cases where pursuit has not followed the victory:--Wagram, Friedland, Vittoria, Cannae, Malplaquet, Albuera, Spicheren, Bull Run, and the case treated in this volume, among scores of others.