The battles of the British Army : $b being a popular account of all the principal engagements during the last hundred yearsBlackwood, Robert Melvin
History
The battles of the British Army : $b being a popular account of all the principal engagements during the last hundred years
Blackwood, Robert Melvin
Battles -- Great Britain; Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
As is so often the case in war, those upon the spot, Lord Raglan and
General Camobert, though fully aware of a large accession to the
enemy’s strength, were not so well posted as to its precise extent as
were their fellow-countrymen in France and England. In both countries
intense anxiety prevailed as to the outcome of the next engagement of
the war.
They were not long kept in suspense. The Russian plan of attack
comprised a general advance, partly a feint, upon the allied right,
simultaneous with a sortie from the city of Sebastopol. Sunday, the 5th
November, was the day fixed upon.
On the eve of the battle--the night of the 4th November--and again
as early as four o’clock on the morning of the 5th, the bells of
Sebastopol were heard ringing, and it was afterwards ascertained that
the Russian Church was bestowing her blessing upon the soldiers of the
Czar. Moreover, the clangour of the great bells to some extent covered
the sound of the footsteps of the advancing hordes as they crept
forward to the attack some hours before sunrise.
The attack was admirably planned. The extreme southernmost portion of
the Russian army, under Prince Gortschakoff, was to feint an attack
against the Guards and the French under Bosquet, thereby hindering
them from marching to the assistance of our 2nd Division under General
Pennefather, in whose charge lay the district of Mount Inkerman. Mount
Inkerman itself, the real objective of the enemy, was to be assailed by
40,000 men under General Dannenburg. To the north again, the Sebastopol
garrison was to effect a further diversion, engaging the allied left.
Upon the 2nd Division then was to fall the brunt of the fight, for
the possession of the high ground of Mount Inkerman would enable the
Russians to overlook their besieging enemy, hamper their operations,
and, in all probability, compel them to abandon the siege.
On the afternoon of the 4th, General Pennefather, who commanded the
2nd Division, in the absence through illness of Sir de Lacy Evans,
going his rounds as usual, observed a somewhat increased activity on
the part of the enemy, but not of such a nature as to warrant other
than ordinary vigilance. Towards evening a thick mist and heavy
drizzle set in, and the outlying pickets on Mount Inkerman strained
their eyes through the mist and darkness for a possible glimpse of the
enemy. Captain Sargent, indeed, of the 95th, regarded the night as
being specially favourable to an attack by the enemy, and increased
the vigilance of the picket under his command, reloading some of the
wetted rifles with his own hands. Towards four o’clock there rang
out the pealing of the Sebastopol bells aforementioned, and several
men reported that they distinctly heard the rumbling of waggon or
gun-carriage wheels during the early hours of the morning.
With all these premonitions, however, the attack came suddenly, so
favoured were the enemy by mist and darkness.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account