The battles of the British Army : $b being a popular account of all the principal engagements during the last hundred yearsBlackwood, Robert Melvin
History
The battles of the British Army : $b being a popular account of all the principal engagements during the last hundred years
Blackwood, Robert Melvin
Battles -- Great Britain; Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
These last were formed in a double line upon the right, Stewart’s
division was in the centre, a Portuguese division on the left. The
light infantry, under Alten, held the village, and the dragoons,
under Lumley, were placed on the right flank of the Spaniards. Cole’s
division (the fusileers) and a Portuguese brigade, which came up after
the action had commenced, were formed in rear of the centre.
Beresford’s was a medley of three nations. He had thirty thousand
men in position, but not a fourth was British; while nearly one-half
was composed of that worst of military mobs--the Spaniards; nor were
these even brought up in time to admit of their being properly posted.
Blake had promised that his corps should be on the hill of Albuera
before noon on the 15th May, and, with but a few miles to march, with
excellent roads to traverse, the head of his columns reached the ground
near midnight, and the rear at three on the morning of the 16th. Bad as
Beresford’s army was, had it been in hand, more might have been done
with it. It was three o’clock on the 16th before Blake was fairly up,
and six before the fourth division reached the ground; while three fine
British regiments under Kemmis, and Madden’s Portuguese cavalry, never
appeared. As the event showed, a few British soldiers would have proved
invaluable, and these troops, though immediately contiguous during the
long and doubtful struggle that ensued, remained _non-combattant_.
Beresford’s position had been carefully reconnoitred by Soult on the
evening of the 15th, and aware that the fourth British division was
still before Badajoz, and Blake not yet come up, he determined to
attack the marshal without delay. A height, commanding the Valverde
road, if a front attack were made, appeared on his examination of the
ground to be the key of the position; and as Beresford had overlooked
its occupation, Soult ably selected it as the point by which his
principal effort should be made.
A wooded hill behind the Albuera, and within cannon-shot of the allied
right, afforded the French marshal the means of forming a strong column
for attack, without his design being noticed by his opponent. Covered
by the darkness, he brought forward the artillery of Ruty, the fifth
corps under Girard, with the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, and formed
them for his intended assault; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men
and forty guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s right wing, and
yet that general could neither see a man, nor draw a sound conclusion
as to the real plan of attack. The remainder of his corps was placed in
the wood on the banks of the Feria, to bear against Beresford’s left,
and by carrying the bridge and village sever the wings of the allied
army.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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