there before the fall, instead of after, so as to bruise the serpent's head, or behead him, on his attempting to enter? To place a guard over the gate after the Devil had entered, and caused the effectual downfall and ruin of the human race, and thus perpetrated all the mischief he could, looks very much like "locking the stable-door after the horse is stolen." And the query also arises here, Are we not compelled to conclude that Moses' God was a little short-sighted, and rather hasty in his conclusion that every thing was so "very good" when the serpent proved to be so very bad? The only way to escape this dilemma is to assume that God did not make him, and that consequently he was not included in the original invoice of goods and chattels which were pronounced "very good;" but, in adopting this expedient, we only leap "from the frying-pan into the fire:" for the assumption does not do away with the difficulty, because it is declared that God made every thing that was made. Hence it is evident that, if he were made at all, the God of Moses made him; and, if he were not made, then it follows that he is a self-created or self-existent being, and invested with all the attributes, powers, and prerogatives of God Almighty himself. And thus we would place two omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent beings on the throne of the universe; which is not only a moral contradiction, but a moral impossibility. We will assume, then, for the sake of the argument, that God did create the Devil,--an assumption, however, which brings us into still greater difficulty. Christ says, by way of illustrating human character, that "a tree is known by its fruit. A good tree can not bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." In this case God the Creator is the tree, and the Devil the fruit; and one is good, and the other evil. Here, then, is a good tree bearing evil fruit, which seems to furnish the most positive proof that Christ's moral axiom, "A good tree can not bear evil fruit," is false. There is evidently something wrong somewhere in this moral picture. Either Christ was mistaken, or the Christian world is wrong in assuming the existence of this omnipotent and independent being of an opposite character. It presents us with a moral paradox which no theologian in Christendom has yet been able to solve. We are compelled to assume that both beings are good, or both evil, and that they co-operate and act in harmony; or that a good God made a wicked Devil,--i.e., "a good tree brought forth evil fruit;" or else we must reject the Christian system of salvation, and assume the existence of but one invisible and Almighty Being, who orders every thing for the best. The absurdity we have just noticed is but one of many, both of a moral and of a scientific nature, equally senseless and foolish, which we find involved in the Christian plan of salvation. We will notice a few others. According to Christian theology and