To sum up this part of our long and, I fear, rather tiring dissertation on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier that is to be: the Yugoslav delegates at the Peace Conference invariably disclaimed any desire to have Albanian lands conferred on them against the wish of the inhabitants. According to Prince Sixte of Parma, the ex-Emperor Karl was disposed to offer to the Serbs as a basis of peace a Southern Slav kingdom consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the whole of Albania. But this last item only made it clear that in his brief tenure of the throne the Emperor had grasped something of the grand generosity of European statesmen when they deal with the possessions of other people in the Near East. The Albanians are not Southern Slavs, and it is merely the voice of the thoughtless mob in Montenegro which has been claiming Scutari for the reason that they held it in the Middle Ages--several of their rulers are buried there--and because 20,000 Montenegrins gave their lives to take it in the Balkan War. Responsible persons in Yugoslavia, such as Dr. Trumbić, the former Foreign Minister, do not believe that Scutari is a necessity for their State--whether Yugoslavia is a necessity for Scutari is another question--and they hold that it is quite possible to preserve the 1913 frontier (perhaps with a minor rectification in Klementi) and live in friendship with their neighbours. This, of course, is under the assumption that these neighbours will "play the game"--and it is just this which the Albanians will be unable to do if they are left to their own slender resources. How could one expect so poor--or shall we say so unexploited?--a country to make any social progress without the help of others? It has become the habit of many Albanians to accept financial assistance from Italy; if an independent Albania is now established these subsidies will be increased--and he who pays the piper calls the tune. If, however, an arrangement could be made for helping the Albanians--and the country undertaking this would have to be devoid of Balkan ambitions on its own account--then the 1913 frontier would be possible. No doubt the cynics will say that the Yugoslavs are aware that this is an unlikely solution, and that failing a disinterested Power, whose supervision would cause the Albanians during the troublesome civilizing process to be moderately peaceable neighbours, failing such a Power the Yugoslavs would feel that they were justified in asking for the frontier of the Drin. But this frontier I have heard advocated less by Yugoslavs of any standing than by those Albanians who despair of the administrative capacities of their fellow-countrymen. The Yugoslavs have not the smallest wish to add to their commitments, and even if all the Albanians on the right bank of the Drin were anxious for Yugoslav overlordship--and this, naturally, is not the case--there would be serious hostility to be expected from some of those on the other bank.