cannot be defended by a State which is not in possession of the hinterland. In time of peace a very strong army would be needed; Italy would, in fact, have to double her army for the defence of a frontier 700 kilometres long. And in the event of war it would be necessary either to abandon Dalmatia or to form two armies of operation, one on the frontiers of Julian Venetia, the other in Dalmatia, and without any liaison between them. From the military point of view it is incomparably more to the interest of Italy that she should live on friendly terms with the people of the eastern shore of the Adriatic than that she should maintain there an army out of all proportion to her military and economic resources--an army which in time of war would be worse than useless, since, as M. Gauvain observes, the submarines, which would find their nesting-places in the islands, would destroy the lines of communication. An Italian naval argument is, that if she had to fight on the eastern side of the Adriatic her sailors in the morning would have the sun in their eyes; but the Yugoslavs would be similarly handicapped in the case of an evening battle. With regard to the economic reasons, the longitudinal lines will continue to guarantee to the Germans and Magyars the commercial monopoly of the East, and Italy will perceive that she has paid very dearly for a blocked-up window. The sole method by which Italy can from the Adriatic cause her commerce to penetrate to the Balkans is by concluding with a friendly Yugoslavia the requisite commercial treaties, which will grow more valuable with the construction of the lateral railways, running inland from the coast, which Austrians and Magyars so constantly impeded. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF LONDON