The volunteer army set out on the 10th and reached the Prophet’s village in the afternoon. Near that place the spies which Governor Reynolds had sent out on the 8th to reconnoiter and locate the enemy[113] met the army and reported that they had captured an Indian, who had truly informed them that Black Hawk was on Rock River, above Dixon’s Ferry, as had been previously reported. Disappointed at such a delay as the march to Black Hawk’s camp would incur, the men fired the Prophet’s village and burned every vestige of it–an act wholly unwarranted and useless. About twelve miles above the Prophet’s village the army camped, and, for reasons utterly inconceivable at this late day, decided to abandon all the cumbersome baggage and provisions and force a march to overtake the Indians. Whether the troops, who considered it part of their duty to dictate policies to their superior officers, clamored for such a move, or whether it emanated from the officer in command, has never been explained to this day, either in books or personal interviews had by the writer. Whiteside got all the blame for it, but I believe that his action was governed by pressure from the headstrong militia, who desired to accomplish too much in a limited time, and the passion of Governor Reynolds to manage the campaign to a rapid and glorious finish. It was an unfortunate act at best. Perishable property was piled up to waste, unprotected and regardless of future needs. With scarcely enough to last them in a forced march to another base, where abundance might await them, these impatient men marched into a wilderness where defeat might overtake them, with only rations enough to last for a period of three or four days. This criminal indiscretion was the first cause of dissatisfaction among the men. The commander should have known that those who urge the most haste have for all time been first to find fault when the first evidence of its indiscretion appears and at once vetoed the foolhardy move.