The Blocking of ZeebruggeCarpenter, Alfred Francis Blakeney
History
The Blocking of Zeebrugge
Carpenter, Alfred Francis Blakeney
World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations, British; Zeebrugge-Ostend Raids, 1918
A good deal of consideration had to be given to the choice of officers.
The question of seniority of the blockship commanders gave food for
thought. Each of these vessels would also require at least three
executive officers. The chance of the captain being bowled over early
in the proceedings was none too small. So the conning and steering
arrangements and the whole system of command in each ship was to be
triplicated. Thus each officer must be ready to take over the
responsibility of command at a moment's notice. Similar considerations
affected the choice of officers for the storming vessels. Still
further executive officers were required for charge of the storming
parties. Engineer officers must be forthcoming for these special
vessels. At first all these officers, just as in the case of the men,
knew nothing of the circumstances under which they were required,
except that it was for a hazardous business.
The majority of the officers and men for the blockships and storming
vessels were drawn from the Grand Fleet; most of the remainder were
obtained from the naval depots.
[Sidenote: The American Battle Squadron]
When visiting the United States of America at the {107} end of 1918 I
was often asked to explain why American naval personnel were not
included in the enterprise. On more than one occasion there were
strong evidences of disagreeable insinuations having been circulated
through pro-German influences. It was suggested that relations between
the British and American squadrons in the Grand Fleet left much to be
desired, and that feelings of jealousy had caused us to decline
American assistance for the purposes of our enterprise. Nothing could
be further from the truth. The American battle squadron was never
referred to as such. They formed the "sixth" battle squadron of the
Grand Fleet. Their ships and ours constituted _one_ fleet, working for
a single end and guided by common sentiment. For the furtherance of
successful co-operation the Americans had literally "thrown overboard"
everything that could weaken the combination. Their signalling
arrangements, tactical manoeuvring, and special gunnery methods had all
been brought into line with ours. The unselfishness and sacrifice
involved can only be fully appreciated by members of our own sea
service.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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