The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General StaffWilkinson, Spenser
History
The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff
Wilkinson, Spenser
Prussia (Germany). Armee. Grosser Generalstab
It is not contended that the system here described is perfect. Every
system has its failures, and there is no possibility of entirely
excluding the influences of favour or prejudice. But it may be
asserted with confidence that the high average of practical ability
secured in the superior officers of the Prussian army is due in the
main to the practice of selection, the careful inspection by the
superiors, at every stage, and to the mature wisdom by which the higher
education of the general staff is directed. The intellectual
advancement of the officers of every army is confronted by a peculiar
difficulty. The foundations of all military institutions are authority
and obedience--principles which appear to be directly opposed to the
free movement of intelligence. Every army is constantly in danger of
decay from mental stagnation. Free criticism is liable to undermine
discipline, and the habit of unconditional obedience too often destroys
the independence of judgment without which moral and intellectual
progress is impossible. The Prussian general staff has escaped from
this dilemma by itself taking the lead in scientific progress, and
organizing itself, in regard to all that concerns the business of
national defence, as an institution for the advancement of learning.
[1] Cf. Colonel Maurice in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ article "War,"
p. 345: "There does not exist, and never has existed ... an 'art of
war' which was something other than the methodic study of military
history."
[2] It is interesting to note that Moltke was a pupil at the War
Academy from 1823 to 1826, while Clausewitz was its director. The
director, however, is not a teacher, and Clausewitz did not publish any
of his principal works during his lifetime, so that the evidence does
not prove a personal influence of Clausewitz upon Moltke.
[3] See Vom Kriege, _Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von
Clausewitz_, Zweites Buch, Fünftes Capitel.
[4] Clausewitz is fully aware of the difficulty with which this
critical study has to contend, that the real causes, the motives which
led to the adoption of a particular measure, are in many cases unknown.
[5] It may be interesting to compare with what follows Foster's _Essay
on Decision of Character_, Letter VI., in which the value of a
"conclusive manner of thinking" is discussed.
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