The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
“This contrast, so favourable to England, has been constantly
maintained, and can only be attributable to her superior artillery.
Her seamen not only aimed with greater precision, and fired more
steadily than those of the French and of other nations, but they
had the reputation of loading with far greater rapidity. It was
remarked, in 1805, that the English could fire a round with ball
every minute, whereas it took the French gunners three minutes
to perform the same operation. Then, again, the English tactics
were superior. It was the universal practice of the French to seek
to dismast an adversary; they consequently aimed high, while the
English invariably concentrated their fire upon the hulls of their
adversaries; and clearly the broadside of a vessel presents a much
better mark to aim at than the mere masts and rigging. British guns
were also usually of higher calibre, for though they bore the same
denomination, they were in reality much heavier. Thus, the English
_Lavinia_, though nominally a frigate of forty guns, actually
carried fifty; and thirty-six and 38-gun frigates nearly always
carried forty-four and forty-six. The English ship _Belleisle_,
at Trafalgar, though said to be a seventy-four, carried ninety
pieces of ordnance, while the Spanish ship she engaged, though
called eighty-four had, in fact, only seventy-eight guns. From this
disparity in the number and calibre of their guns, as well as in
the mode in which they were served, it resulted that France and her
allies lost eighty-five ships of the line and 180 frigates, while
her antagonist only suffered to the extent of thirteen ships of the
line and eighty-three frigates.
“It was not until the close of the war that France became fully
aware to what an extent her inferiority in the above respects had
contributed to her reverses; otherwise the unfortunate Admiral
Villeneuve would not invariably have ascribed his mishaps to the
inexperience of his officers and men, and to the incomplete and
inferior equipment of his vessels. The truth was, that not only was
the artillery, as we have shown, inferior, but the whole system in
vogue at that period on board French ships was antiquated, having
continued without reform or improvement for two hundred years; it
was deficient, too, in enforcing subordination, that most essential
condition of the power and efficiency of a ship of war.”
The French _inscription maritime_ is then dealt with at great length,
after which occur the following passages, even more interesting perhaps
to-day than when they were written:--
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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