A Jacobite rising in England was planned. In conjunction with it the French proposed to hold the Channel in superior force to cover the landing of troops in England, and then, by a blockade in the Irish Channel, prevent the return of King William and his army. The attitude of the English fleet was uncertain--a strong Jacobite element being in it--and the scheme was generally a very promising one for the French. A personal appeal from Queen Mary is said to have secured the allegiance of the English fleet: but in everything else the subsequent French failure was due only to luck and the wisdom of the British Admiral, Lord Torrington. It was more or less realised that the French would concentrate at Brest. Squadrons were sent out to interfere with this, but convoys and the like bulked largely in their orders. There is not the remotest indication that the Home Government appreciated the danger, which ended in Torrington finding himself opposed by a greatly superior French fleet, which he was ordered to fight at all costs. Therefrom ensued the battle of Beachy Head, a defeat and a “strategical retirement to the rear” for which Torrington was subsequently court-martialled and acquitted. He alone appears to have realised that his defeat would have meant the success of the French plans, while so long as he could avoid action the threat of his existence must interfere with invasion. The French movements throughout were somewhat obscure. On the 25th June, according to Torrington, they might have attacked him but did not do so. When the battle took place on the 30th, it was Torrington who attacked. In the subsequent retreat, the French pursued for four days, but did so in line of battle and without much energy. They captured or destroyed five disabled ships, but of real following up of the victory there was none. The Anglo-Dutch fleet took shelter at the Nore; but the French drew off at Dover, and sailing west attacked Teignmouth and then returned to Brest. Their failure to follow up and destroy Torrington has never been satisfactorily explained. The panic which they had created in England bore early fruit. Thirty new ships were laid down. Of these seventeen were eighty-gun ships of 1000 tons, three were 1050 tons but carried seventy guns only, the remaining ten, sixty-gun ships of 900 tons. In 1692 another Jacobite rising was planned, and a French army collected to assist it. Taught by the experience of Beachy Head the Anglo-Dutch fleet concentrated early. It consisted of no less than ninety-eight ships of the line,[18] besides frigates and auxiliaries, the whole being under command of Russell. A descent upon St. Malo was the principal objective contemplated. Neither side appears to have had much conception of the intentions of the other. De Tourville, with a fleet of only fifty ships of the line, is supposed to have sailed under the impression that the Dutch had not joined up with the English.