Nelson, meanwhile, touched Gibraltar,[60] then proceeded north to join Cornwallis off Brest, and thence to England in his flagship _Victory_. Villeneuve, having picked up a few more ships at Ferrol, making his total force twenty-nine sail, put into Cadiz,[61] off which Collingwood maintained a weary blockade of him. [Illustration: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 1805.] Early in September, news reached England that Villeneuve was at Cadiz, and Nelson left Southsea Beach on September 14th, sailing next day. Collingwood, off Cadiz, had been reinforced up to twenty-four sail. A martinet officer of the old type, it is likely enough that had Villeneuve come out, he might have done something against the worn-out blockaders. The arrival of Nelson, on September 28th, changed all this. Collingwood’s red tape restrictions were countermanded, and the spirit of the entire fleet changed accordingly. As usual, Nelson spared no effort to keep the men fit and healthy. On the 19th October, Villeneuve came out--driven thereto by threats from Napoleon. As Napoleon had broken up his Boulogne camp on August 26th and by now had the greater part of that army in Germany, his forcing Villeneuve to sea is one of those mysteries which can never be fathomed. He acted in the teeth of naval advice, and there are few more pathetic pictures in history than the disgraced Villeneuve putting to sea to known certain defeat, endeavouring to fire his men with hope.[62] On the 20th October, the Franco-Spanish fleet was at sea with thirty-three ships of the line, the British consisting of twenty-seven. Nelson let the enemy get clear of the land, and then on October 21st, attacked them off Trafalgar. Of this battle so much has been written that any detailed description here is superfluous. To this day, the historians dispute as to what the exact tactics were, and it is doubtful whether anything will ever get beyond Professor Laughton’s summary in his _Nelson_. Here the most emphasis is laid on the fact that in his memorandum of October 9th, Nelson expected to handle forty ships against a still larger hostile force. All these matters are, however, but for the academicians. The main facts are that Nelson correctly gauged the inability and gunnery inefficiency of the enemy and sailed down on them in two lines ahead, they lying in line abreast--a position which, had they been able to shoot well, promised them victory better than any other. As an exhibition of tactics, Trafalgar was not even original--Rodney in the past had done something very similar. On no principle of “theory” was Nelson right. Simply and solely his genius lay in ability to calculate the human element, to lay his plans accordingly, and to achieve certain victory on that!