The British battle fleet, Vol. 2 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 2 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that
junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to
“super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly
any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing
percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less
convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts”
might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of
some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as
any that the “fifties” saw.
As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put
forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance
against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and
“not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being
screened with very numerous smaller craft.
When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred
anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for
all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally,
but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within
easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get
in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with
the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult
proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available.
The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that
attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from
several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing
number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have
a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to
succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft
exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere
of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly
danger.
On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big
ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also
asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also
search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons?
There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other,
the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and
so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so
again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it.
_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._
The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between
the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as
second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid
down in 1901.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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