_May_ 24.--Great gas attack. Fourth Division on left had full force of it, lost heavily, but could not be shifted. In the evening had to retire five hundred yards for the first time since the fighting began. General result of a long day of furious fighting was some contraction of the British line along its whole length, but no gap for the passage of the enemy. This may be looked upon as a last despairing effort {114} of the Germans, as no serious attempt was afterwards made that year to force the road to Ypres. Such, in a condensed form, was the record of the second Battle of Ypres, which for obstinacy in attack and inflexibility in defence can only be compared with the first battle in the same section six months before. Taking these two great battles together, their result may be summed up in the words that the Germans, with an enormous preponderance of men in the first and of guns in the second, had expended several hundred thousand of their men with absolutely no military advantage whatever. {115} CHAPTER V THE BATTLE OF RICHEBOURG--FESTUBERT (May 9-24) The New Attack--Ordeal of the 25th Brigade--Attack of the 1st Division--Fateful days--A difficult situation--Attack of the 2nd Division--Attack of the 7th Division--British success--Good work of Canadians--Advance of the 47th London Division--Lull before the storm. Whilst this desperate fighting was going on in the north a very extensive and costly operation had been begun in the south, a great attack being made by the First Army, with the main purpose of engaging the German troops and preventing them from sending help to their comrades, who were hard pressed by the French near Arras. In this the movement was entirely successful, but the direct gain of ground was not commensurate with the great exertions and losses of the Army. For some days the results were entirely barren, but the patient determination of Sir John French and of Sir Douglas Haig had their final reward, and by May 25, when the movement had been brought to a close, there had been a general advance of 600 yards over a front of four miles, with a capture of 10 machine guns and some 800 prisoners. These meagre trophies of victory may, however, hardly be said to compensate us for the {116} severe and unavoidable losses which must always in the case of the attack be heavier than those of the defence.