The British Campaign in France and Flanders—January to July, 1918Doyle, Arthur Conan
History
The British Campaign in France and Flanders—January to July, 1918
Doyle, Arthur Conan
World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- Western Front
perhaps too far back, but the first item at least depended upon the
general weakness of manpower. Nowhere can one lay one's hand upon
any solid ground for complaint, save against the rogues and fools of
Brest-Litovsk, who by their selfish and perjured peace enabled the
Germans to roll a tidal wave of a million men from east to west, with
the certainty that they would wash away the first dam against which
they struck. If there is any military criticism to be made, it lies
rather in the fact that the French help from the south was nearly
sixty hours before it made itself felt at the nearest part of the
British line, and also in the surprising number of draft reserves
kept in England at that date. Within a month of the battle 350,000
had been sent to the {202} front--a very remarkable feat, but a sign,
surely, of an equally remarkable omission. Had ten emergency
divisions of infantry been made out of the more forward of these
drafts, had they been held ready in the rear zones, and had the
actual existing reserves been pushed up to the front, it is safe to
say that the German advance would have been stopped earlier and would
probably not have got beyond the Peronne-Noyon line. If, as was
stated in Parliament, it was confidently expected that the German
attack would strike exactly where it did, then it does seem
deplorable that the nearest reserve to the Fifth Army, a single
division, had, through our weak man-power, to be kept at a three
days' journey from the point of danger. If, instead of searching the
record of the General for some trace of weakness, our critics had
realised the rapidity of his decision, with the moral courage and
grasp of actuality which he showed by abandoning his positions--no
easy thing for one of his blood and record--and falling back unbroken
upon a new line of defence beyond the German heavy artillery, they
could not have failed to admit that the country owes a deep debt of
gratitude to General Gough. Had he hesitated and his army been
isolated and destroyed, the whole war might well have taken a most
sinister turn for the worse.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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