The British Campaign in France and Flanders—January to July, 1918Doyle, Arthur Conan
History
The British Campaign in France and Flanders—January to July, 1918
Doyle, Arthur Conan
World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- Western Front
The main effort of the enemy upon March 24 was directed against the
Fifth and Seventh Corps in the centre of the British line, though his
energy at other points was sufficient to engage the full attention of
all the other units. Heavy and fresh masses were poured in at the
centre and the pressure was great. For the Seventh Corps it was the
fourth day of incessant and desperate fighting. There were few men
left, and these were very exhausted. Towards evening the left of the
Seventh had been turned, and had been compromised by the occupation
of Sailly Saillisel. All attempts at counter-attack, however
gallant, were destined to failure, or at the best evanescent success,
for there was not the weight to carry them through. At 4.15 the
report was: "The enemy is through on the right flank and has occupied
Combles, Morval, and Lesbœufs." The Seventh Corps then fell back
to the line Hem-Maurepas and threw out every stray unit it could get
together--troops of cavalry, Canadian motor-guns, crews and
machine-guns of tanks, and all the powdered débris {122} of broken
formations, in the direction of Bernafoy Wood to cover the exposed
flank. It was still out of touch with the Fifth Corps. This
movement gave the line an awkward angle from Peronne and made it
almost impossible to hold the stretch of river. For the time the
right of the Third Army was a good five miles behind the left of the
Fifth Army--the result, as Sir Douglas Haig has stated, of an
unauthorised local withdrawal due to misunderstanding of orders. The
line near Peronne was still held by the Thirty-ninth Division.
Throughout the morning of the 24th strong enemy forces were seen by
them pushing forwards between Clery and Rancourt, where they were
harassed by the British fire in enfilade, particularly on the roads,
where the artillery of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth Divisions
caused much havoc and confusion, doing great work at short range over
open sights. Many excellent targets were missed, however, owing to
that difficulty in liaison between the infantry and the guns, which
was one of the greatest problems of the operations. During the day
the average number of rounds fired per battery was 3000, most of
which were observed fire.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account