The British Navy in BattlePollen, Arthur Joseph Hungerford
History
The British Navy in Battle
Pollen, Arthur Joseph Hungerford
Great Britain. Royal Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
quite as accurate as they were before the firing began, and indeed the
exactitude of the results precluded this form of error from explaining
the failure to complete the business.
At last, when the firing times of the two ships were compared with
the observers’ records of the pitching of the shell, the true
explanation leapt into sight. The whole show had broken down over
the old difficulty of the identification of shots. The people in the
aeroplanes could not tell whether a particular shot had been fired
by _Mersey_ or _Severn_, and as both ships got the message, neither
could tell whose shot had been observed. It followed therefore that
the consequent correction was often put on to the wrong gun. Thus, for
example, suppose _Mersey_ had fired a shot 300 yards over the target
that fell in bush and was invisible to the observers, while _Severn_
had fired one that was 200 yards short and visible. The observers
would wireless 200 short, whereupon the _Mersey_ would think that this
message was intended for her, and raise her sight by this amount.
Her next round, of course, would go still farther into the bush, and
suppose this was visible or partially visible to the observer, who
might perhaps have missed _Severn’s_ next round, he might telegraph
back 500 or 600 over, a correction that _Severn_ might take to herself,
and lose her next shot in the bush short of the target. The men on
the Rufigi in short discovered for themselves, by their experiences
on this first arduous day against the _Koenigsberg_, that the problem
of correcting the fire of two separated batteries by the work of a
single observer is so exceedingly difficult of solution as to make
it hardly worth attempting. The lessons so painfully brought home
were put to immediate and most successful use. It was resolved on the
second attempt that only one monitor should fire at a time. This was
not of course the only experience of value obtained in the first day’s
operation for when all the results were collated and compared, a pretty
exact knowledge of the actual range from the chosen anchorage to the
target was obtained, so that on the second day there were fewer initial
rounds lost before shell began to fall in the immediate surroundings
of the enemy, where the position of each could be verified. When all
ambiguity as to the meaning of corrections was removed, the process of
finding the target and keeping the range became exceedingly simple.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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