My correspondence in 1909 and 1910 shows that these principles were fully grasped by many gunnery officers in the navy in these years. And I must confess I was extremely astonished when our proceedings at the Dardanelles in March and February and April showed that there was no common practice in the matter throughout the navy. At last, in the month of May 1915, I set out these elementary principia of indirect firing in _Land and Water_. “The difficulty in correcting the fire of a multitude of ships is, it may be added, twofold, because each salvo must be identified as coming from a particular ship, and then that ship be informed of the correction. There is apparently no escape from the necessity of having a separate spotter for each ship. If the spotter is in an independent position, the obstacles in the way of this double task are considerable. And aeroplanes are not a satisfactory substitute. _At best an aeroplane can help one ship only._” It will be observed that in July the officers at the Rufigi had to work them all out again for themselves! Nothing could better illustrate the curious individualism which governs the organization of our sea forces. Each ship, each squadron, each fleet seems to come to the study of these things as if they were virgin problems, entirely unaided by advice or information from the central authorities, so that there is not only no uniformity of practice--in itself a not unmitigated evil--but what is really serious, a total absence of uniformity of knowledge. I am the last person in the world to suggest that all naval affairs should be regulated in every petty detail from Whitehall. There are quite enough forces at work to repress freedom of thought or restrict liberty to investigate and experiment in the fullest possible way. But there is surely the widest possible difference between a restraining tyranny and an intelligent system of communicating proved principles and the results of successful practice. CHAPTER X CAPTURE OF H.I.G.M.S. “EMDEN” On November 11, 1914, the Secretary of the Admiralty issued a statement which, after referring to the self-internment of _Koenigsberg_ in the Rufigi River, and the measures taken to keep her there, proceeded as follows: “Another large combined operation by fast cruisers, against the _Emden_, has been for some time in progress. In this search, which covered an immense area, the British cruisers have been aided by French, Russian, and Japanese vessels working in harmony. His Majesty’s Australian ships _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_ were also included in these movements. “On Monday morning news was received that the _Emden_, which had been completely lost after her action with the _Jemchug_, had arrived at Keeling, Cocos Island, and had landed an armed party to destroy the wireless station and cut the cable.