Shortly after the outbreak of war Admiral Cradock transferred his flag from _Suffolk_ to _Good Hope_ and made his way round the Horn, taking _Monmouth_, _Glasgow_, and the liner _Otranto_ with him. The old battleship, _Canopus_, was despatched from home to join his flag, and actually caught him up some time before the action. The _Canopus_ needed time either for refitting, to coal, or to re-provision, and the Admiral, instead of waiting for her, pursued his way north with his original three ships. Before _Canopus_ joined the flag the last letters written by the officers and men of the squadron were posted, and in one of these a member of his staff stated that the general feeling was that the ships were inadequate to the task set before them, and so far, at least, as their mission was concerned, the naval supremacy of Great Britain was not being employed to any useful purpose. Certain truths with regard to the force that Cradock took north, and of the force that he attacked, should be borne in mind. _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, and _Glasgow_ were as a squadron, markedly faster than Von Spee’s squadron. Whether the _Otranto_ was capable of more than 22 or 23 knots I do not know; but the three warships certainly had the heels of the Germans. It is, then, obvious that if Admiral Cradock’s staff regarded themselves and their ships as inadequate or in danger, it cannot have been because, had the enemy attacked them, they would have been unable to escape. It is next equally obvious that had the Admiral kept _Canopus_ with him, while the pace of the squadron would have been brought down from 23 knots to 15, its fighting value, as measured by broadside power, would have been very much greater than Von Spee’s. That Von Spee at least thought so is clear from his published letters. Without _Canopus_, then, Cradock would have been safe if he had run away. With _Canopus_ he would have been reasonably safe if he had awaited the enemy’s attack. The significance of the letter which I have alluded to is that it was written by a man to whom neither of these contingencies seemed to be open. The superiority in speed which would always have made it possible for Cradock to evade Von Spee was also the one quality of his ships that gave him capacity to attack the Germans if they showed any signs of avoiding action. No doubt, if the Germans would have awaited action by a squadron which included the _Canopus_ Admiral Cradock’s chances might have been brilliant. But if he started out to look for Von Spee with a 15-knot squadron, his chances for acting swiftly on any information that came his way would have been greatly reduced; and to have limited his advance to 15 knots would have been handing over the initiative in the matter entirely to the enemy.