Viewing this action apart from the circumstances that led up to it and the magnificent spirit and self-sacrifice displayed, its technical and historical interest lies chiefly in the fact that it is the only instance in the war in which an inferior force has sought action with one incomparably stronger. The weaker, not only sought battle, but apparently executed no defensive manœuvres of any kind whatever. We shall find, for instance, no parallel in Coronel to the tactics of Von Spee at the Falkland Islands, or to those of Admiral Scheer at Jutland. And it is perhaps remarkable that the British Admiral, once having determined on action which he must have known would be desperate, did not either at once attempt to close the enemy at full speed, so as to give his very inferior artillery and his torpedoes a chance of inflicting serious damage on the enemy while daylight lasted, or delay closing until bad light would make long-range gunnery impossible, in a _mêlée_ at point blank. Anything might have happened, and it was to the weaker side’s interest to leave as much as possible to chance. It is hardly conceivable that the total result of the action could have been different so far as the British squadron is concerned. But it is permissible to speculate as to whether the Germans might not have suffered more, had either of the above plans been followed. The reasoning which dictated Admiral Cradock’s tactics can, of course, never be known. A matter of considerable technical interest is, that though two armoured cruisers kept firing for a considerable period, it is quite clear from Von Spee’s despatch that their fire was completely ineffective. Everyone has agreed in explaining this largely by the extreme difficulty of gunnery conditions, but it is surely highly probable that the chief cause is to be found in the fire of the German ships having, so far as the power of offence is concerned, put _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ out of action within very few minutes of action beginning. All accounts agree in the _Scharnhorst’s_ salvo having found _Good Hope_ within five minutes, and it is not likely that _Monmouth_ fared any better at the hands of _Gneisenau_. What seems to me remarkable is the length of time the ships kept afloat after being militarily useless. The explosion in _Good Hope_ took place after she was in action fifty minutes, and it is not known when she sank. The _Monmouth_ survived the opening salvoes by two hours and twenty minutes, and to the last seemed to have her engines in perfect working order. It is impossible, I think, to resist the inference, that all the German hitting, except the shell that caused the explosion in _Good Hope_, was done in the first few minutes of action, while the light was at its best, though the range was at its longest. CHAPTER XII BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (I) THE CAREER OF VON SPEE (II)