He ran straight alongside and boarded her without a moment’s delay. As at Trafalgar, so here we see the British commander pre-occupied with one thought only--to bring the enemy to action as soon as possible and to finish the business quickly and decisively. So long as this is ensured, there is no thought of losses nor any hesitation in risking the ship. Why was there any other tactical conception? It arose, as we have just seen, in the war of 1812 and was spontaneously reproduced in 1905, and in both cases it was the product of a new skill in long-range gunnery. In 1812 there was the choice in armament, long range and short range that existed in 1905, but with this striking difference. The long-range gun of a century ago might be an eighteen or twenty-four pounder, but it was far heavier for the weight of shell it used than the short-range carronade. There was therefore a distinct temptation to arm ships with a lighter gun that would be more effective at close range, and the mistake was not discovered till the greater skill of the American ships made it clear that the long gun, in a ship rightly handled, could prevent the short-range gun from coming into action at all. But in our own day the pride of length of reach goes with the heavier projectile. Not that the 12-inch guns of _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ literally outranged the 8.2’s of Von Spee, for the Germans have always mounted their guns, as we have seen, so that they can be elevated far more greatly than our own. It is quite possible therefore, that, speaking literally, Von Spee’s 8.2’s, as they were mounted, might have outranged Sir Doveton Sturdee’s 12-inch. But at the extreme range of the 12-inch, it would be almost impossible for the 8.2’s to hit on account of the extremely steep angle at which the shot falls, and, consequently, the high accuracy in range knowledge required and the improbability of the gun shooting with perfect precision at such extreme distances. But both in 1812 and now, the basic idea behind seeking for a long-range decision is defensive. Captain Glossop opened up the range when _Emden_ closed him and got the advantage of his heavy artillery. Admiral Sturdee kept the range as long as possible to save his ships from being hit. Captain Ellerton did his best to keep _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ out of _Leipzig’s_ reach. In all these cases there was a very obvious argument in favour of defensive tactics. _Sydney_, _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_, _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were all at very great distances from dockyards and possibilities of repairs. The two battle-cruisers were a considerable percentage of our total Dreadnought force. It was not a question of risking their destruction; it might at any moment be vital for them to be immediately ready for action. If possible, even the shortest period devoted to repairs and docking should be avoided. These considerations do not excuse defensive tactics; they may be said to have imposed them. But