The only evidences of a strategical blunder in the disposition would be, first, a failure of the chosen plan to bring the Germans to action, next a failure to defeat them when brought to action, because of inability to concentrate the requisite strength for the purpose at the critical point. It is surely a sufficient reply to say that the German Fleet was brought to action, and that any incompleteness in the victory arose, not from there being insufficient forces present, but owing to circumstances making it impossible to employ them to the greatest advantage. THE ACTION: FIRST PHASE When the enemy was sighted at 3:30, Sir David formed his ships for action in a line of bearing, so that, in the northeasterly wind, the smoke of one ship should not interfere with the fire of the rest. His course was east-southeast, and he was converging on that of the enemy, who was steering rather more directly south. By the time the line was formed the range was about 23,000 yards, and at twelve minutes to four had been closed to 18,500, when both sides opened fire simultaneously. When the range had closed to about 14,000 yards or less, parallel courses were steered and kept until the end of this phase of the engagement. The Fifth Battle Squadron, consisting of four ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class, under the command of Admiral Evan-Thomas, at the time when Sir David formed his battle-line, was about 10,000 yards off--not straight astern of the battle-cruisers, but bearing about half a right angle to port. The course that would bring them immediately into the line of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, then, was not parallel to that steered by Sir David Beatty, but a course converging on to it. It was this that enabled them, with their inferior speed, to come into action at eight minutes past four, though only then at the very long range of 20,000 yards. The interval had been singularly unfortunate for the British side. _Indefatigable_ (Captain Sowerby) had the misfortune to be hit by a shell in a vulnerable spot. The destruction of the ship was instantaneous, and almost the entire personnel, including the ship’s very gallant Captain, was lost. An exactly similar misfortune later befell _Queen Mary_. Neither ship had, in any sense of the word, been overwhelmed by the gunfire of the enemy. Indeed, when _Queen Mary_ went down, the enemy’s fire, which had been singularly accurate and intense in the first phase of the action had, as the Vice-Admiral says in his despatch, slackened. The superior skill, due chiefly to the wider experience of the British fire-control organizations, had already begun to tell--the enemy’s fire-control being evidently unable to survive the damage, and losses of action. [Illustration: The first phase; from Von Hipper’s coming into view, until his juncture with Admiral Scheer]