It is probable that the van was now converging towards him and shortening the range. Scheer was trying to make the gunnery as difficult as possible by his smoke screens, but probably soon realized that, if the range was closed much more, his fleet would soon be in a hopeless situation. At about a quarter to seven, therefore, he launched the first of his torpedo attacks. This had the desired effect. “The enemy,” says the Commander-in-Chief, “constantly turned away and _opened the range_ under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of British fire was felt.” “Opening the range” means that the object of the torpedo attacks had been attained. For a quarter of an hour or more the closing movement of the Grand Fleet was converted into an opening movement. Scheer had prevented the close action that he dreaded. He had gained the time needed to turn his whole force from an easterly to a southwesterly course. [Illustration: A. Battle-Cruiser Fleet; B. Grand Fleet; C. German Fleet Sketch plan of the action from 6 p.m. when the Grand Fleet prepared to deploy, till 6:50 when Admiral Scheer delivered his first massed torpedo attack] Sir David Beatty’s account of his movements up to now is singularly brief. “At six o’clock,” he says, “I altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed.... At 6:20 the Third Battle Squadron bore ahead steaming south towards the enemy’s van. I ordered them to take station ahead.... At 6:25 I altered course to E.S.E. in support of the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship.” Nothing is said of his movements in the next twenty minutes. “By 6:50,” he continues, “the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading Battle Squadron, then bearing N.N.W. three miles from _Lion_.” (_Lion_ was now third ship in the line). “I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and _reduced to eighteen knots_.” There was nothing now to hurry for. The daylight action was, in fact, over. For that matter good visibility was at an end. From 6:0 to 6:50, though never perfect, it had been more favourable to us than to the enemy. Could the British forces have been concentrated for united effort during this period, what might not have resulted? But from 6:0 to 6:17 Scheer had been engaged by Sir David Beatty’s four battle-cruisers only. For a short period after 6:17 it was engaged by some ships of the rear division as well. From 6:30 till the torpedo attacks broke up the Grand Fleet’s gunnery, it was engaged intermittently and at longer range by all three of the main squadrons. But by this time Sir David Beatty had passed ahead, and the survivors of the enemy’s van had begun their turn. THE GERMAN RETREAT