The British Navy in BattlePollen, Arthur Joseph Hungerford
History
The British Navy in Battle
Pollen, Arthur Joseph Hungerford
Great Britain. Royal Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
If ships only engaged when they were stationary the range would not
change, and it could be found by observation without rangefinders.
And even with rangefinders it can never be found at great distances
_without_ observation. But ships do not stand still, and when they
move the distance between them alters from second to second. If these
movements could be (1) ascertained, (2) integrated, and (3) the results
impressed upon the sight, change of range would be eliminated, and we
should have come back to the conditions in which ships were stationary.
Fire control is successful in so far as it succeeds in doing these
three things. Sketches 3 and 4 show the process by which hits are
secured, when the conditions are not complicated by changes in the
range, that is, if these complications have been eliminated by fire
control. The second two illustrate what these complications are. The
ships turn away from each other and then turn towards each other.
The rate graph (6) shows the effect of these movements on the range and
the rate at which it is changing from moment to moment.
The process shown in Sketches 3 and 4 is called “bracketing.” Two shots
are fired at a difference of, say, 800 yards. Observation shows the
first to be too short, the second to be too far. The difference is
bisected by the third shot. This places the target in one of the halves
of the bracket. This half is bisected by the fourth shot, placing
the target in a quarter. If an eighth of the bracket is less than the
danger space, then the fifth shot must hit.
[Illustration: Range-finding by bracket]
In Sketch 5 the ships keep parallel courses for two minutes. The range
does not change. The line in the graph (6) is, for these two minutes,
horizontal. It is as if both were stationary. When the ships turn the
range increases and the graph rises. But the graph is not a straight
line but a curve. This shows that the rate also is changing. Each
movement of the two ships, whether they keep steady courses or turn,
alters the range and the rate. As projectiles take an interval of time
to travel from the gun to the target, the range must be _forecasted_.
B, then, cannot engage A unless he knows where A is going to be. He
cannot know this until A has settled on a steady course. While A is
turning, then he is safe from gunfire except by a chance shot. B cannot
engage while he is himself turning unless he can integrate his own
movements with A’s. It is this latter difficulty which largely explains
the duration of modern actions. At the mean range of each engagement,
with ships standing still, _Sydney_ could have sunk _Emden_ in ten
minutes; _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ could have sunk _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ in fifteen. But it was ninety minutes before _Emden_
was driven on the rocks, 180 before _Scharnhorst_ sank, and 300 before
_Gneisenau_ went under.
[Illustration: The crux of sea fighting, changes of course and speed
produce an irregularly changing range]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account