The fact that Mifflin was given the command of the rear on the retreat, and the fact that he sent the order to Heath that morning to send down all the boats from King's Bridge, lend the highest probability to Gordon's version of the story. Parsons, who was one of the members of the council, mentions this particularly as one of the reasons for withdrawing, namely, that the enemy were "not disposed to storm our lines, but set down to make regular approaches to us." Reed also puts as much stress on this point as any other. Giving the reasons for the retreat to Governor Livingston, he said: "The enemy at the same time possessed themselves of a piece of ground very advantageous and which they had [fortified]. We were therefore reduced to the alternative of retiring to this place or going out with [troops] to drive them off." Washington, too, is to be quoted. In his letter to Trumbull, September 6th, he writes: "As the main body of the enemy had encamped not far from our lines, and as I had reason to believe they intended to force us from them by regular approaches, which the nature of the ground favoured extremely, and at the same time meant, by the ships of war, to cut off the communication between the City and Island, and by that means keep our men divided and unable to oppose them anywhere, by the advice of the General officers, on the night of the 29th, I withdrew our troops from thence without any loss of men and but little baggage." William B. Reed's account (Reed's Life of Reed) is to the effect, briefly, that a heavy fog settled over Long Island on the 29th, and that during the day Colonel Reed, Colonel Grayson, and General Mifflin rode to Red Hook inspecting the lines. While at the Hook, "a shift of wind" cleared the fog from the harbor, enabling the officers to catch a glimpse of the fleet at the Narrows. From certain movements of boats they inferred that the ships would sail up with the favorable breeze if it held until the tide turned and the fog cleared off. They immediately hurried to Washington, informed him of the impending danger, and induced him to call a council and order a retreat. Mr. Bancroft, however, has shown very thoroughly that this account cannot be accepted, because the fog did not come up until the morning of the 30th, and no change of wind occurred. Colonel Reed himself says in the Livingston letter, written only the next morning, that the enemy's fleet were attempting every day to get up to town with "the wind _ahead_"--thus directly contradicting his biographer. The Reed account has several errors of detail, one being the statement that the Red Hook battery had been badly damaged by the guns of the Roebuck on the 27th. It would be nearer the truth to say that it was not hit at all. The fleet could do nothing that day; as Admiral Howe reports, the Roebuck was "the only ship that could fetch high enough to the northward to exchange _a few random shot_ with the battery on Red Hook."