Brigadier Lord Stirling to command the front of our lines next Hudson's River and to command the reserve within the lines, and when either of the other Brigade Generals have the command of the Advance Lines Lord Stirling is to have command of his post in his absence. Each Brigadier General to assign the Alarm Posts to the several Regiments under their command. [No. 3.] GENERAL ORDERS HEAD-QUARTERS LONG ISLAND Aug. 29, 1776. Parole, SULLIVAN, } Countersign, GREEN. } As the sick are an encumbrance to the Army, & Troops are expected this afternoon from the flying camp in Jersey, under Genl Mercer, who is himself arrived & room & cover is wanted for the troops, the commanding Officers of Regt's are immediately to have such sick removed. They are to take their Arms & Accoutrements & be conducted by an Officer to the Genl Hospital, as a rendezvous & then to cross to-gether under the directions of the Person appointed there, taking general Directions from Dr Morgan. As the above Forces under Genl Mercer are expected this afternoon, the General proposes to relieve a proportionate Number of Regiments & make a change in the situation of them. The Commanding Officers of Regiments are therefore to parade their men with their Arms, Accoutrements, and Knapsacks, at 7 oClock, at the Head of their Encampments & there wait for Orders.[232] [From MS. Order Book of Col. Wm. Douglas.] [Footnote 232: The series of Washington's general orders in Force's Archives does not contain this order of August 29th, which throws light on the preparations made for the retreat. It is found, abridged, in both Col. Little's and Capt. Douglass's order books; in Col. Douglas's book it appears in the above form. Original in the possession of Benjamin Douglas, Esq., Middletown, Conn.] HEAD-QUARTERS, NEW YORK, August 31, 1776. (Parole, HARLEM.) (Countersign, FLUSHING.) ... Both officers and soldiers are informed that the retreat from _Long-Island_ was made by the unanimous advice of all the General Officers, not from any doubts of the spirit of the troops, but because they found the troops very much fatigued with hard duty, and divided into many detachments, while the enemy had their main body on the Island, and capable of receiving assistance from the shipping. In these circumstances it was thought unsafe to transport the whole of an Army on an Island, or to engage them with a part, and therefore unequal numbers; whereas now our whole Army is collected together, without water intervening, while the enemy can receive little assistance from their ships. Their Army is, and must be, divided into many bodies, and fatigued with keeping up a communication with their ships; whereas ours is connected and can act together. They must effect a landing under so many disadvantages, that if officers and soldiers are vigilant, and alert to prevent surprise, and add spirit when they approach, there is no doubt of our success.... [Force, 5th Series, Vol. I., p. 1248.]