LOSSBERG'S BRIGADE. COLONEL VON LOSSBERG. REGIMENTS. Von Ditfurth. Von Trumbach. * * * * * When and where, now, will these two armies meet? Or rather, the question was narrowed down to this: When and where will the British attack? With Washington there was no choice left but to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. The command which the enemy had of the waters was alone sufficient to make their encampment on Staten Island perfectly secure. As to assuming the offensive, Washington wrote to his brother, John Augustine, on July 22d: "Our situation at present, both in regard to men and other matters, is such as not to make it advisable to attempt any thing against them, surrounded as they are by water and covered with ships, lest a miscarriage should be productive of unhappy and fatal consequences. It is provoking, nevertheless, to have them so near, without being able to give them any disturbance." Earlier in the season an expedition had been organized under Mercer, in which Knowlton was to take an active part, to attack the enemy's outposts on Staten Island from the Jersey shore, but the weather twice interfered with the plan. All that the Americans hoped to do was to hold their own at and around New York. Washington tells us that he fully expected to be able to defend the city.[105] Even the passage of the Rose and Phoenix did not shake his faith. None of his letters written during the summer disclose any such misgivings as Lee expressed, respecting the possibility of maintaining this base, and in attempting to hold it he followed out his own best military judgment. [Footnote 105: "Till of late I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place."--_Washington to Congress_, September 2d, 1776.] What occasioned the principal anxiety in the mind of the commander-in-chief was the number of points at which the British could make an attack and their distance from one another. They could advance into New Jersey from Staten Island; they could make a direct attack upon the city with their fleet, while the transports sailed up the Hudson and the troops effected a landing in his rear; they could cross to Long Island and fall upon Greene in force; or they could make landings at different points as feints, and then concentrate more rapidly than Washington, as their water carriage would enable them to do, and strike where he was weakest.[106] [Footnote 106: "Before the landing of the enemy in Long Island, the point of attack could not be known, nor any satisfactory judgment formed of their intentions. It might be on Long Island, on Bergen, or directly on the city."--_Washington to Congress_, September 9th, 1776.] The summer and the campaign season were passing, and still the uncertainty was protracted--when and where will the enemy attack? CHAPTER IV. THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.