The bulk of Early's division was holding the heights from Hazel Run to Hamilton's Crossing; and the sudden assault on the Confederate positions at Marye's, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity of sustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfair use was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale. The loss in this assault seems heavy, when the small force of Confederates is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, inasmuch as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but the infantry fire was very telling; and, as already stated, both colonels commanding the assaulting columns on the right were among the casualties. The enemy's line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks's Ford and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton's Crossing, it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersed Early's forces, and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. But orders precluded anything but an immediate advance. The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions, so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee's pressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it was feasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. If this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to assume that he could have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early's attention and forestall attacks on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of his corps, the vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals were hardest pressed, say ten A.M., and most needed a diversion in their favor. Not that Hooker's salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick's so doing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. But it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground for fault-finding. Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick's whole manoeuvre is good enough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, and would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more been required of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his orders, it may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren-- "It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does a large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force will stop him." "The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind of picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, a little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At daylight, the head of Gen. Sedgwick's troops had got into Fredericksburg. I think some little attempt had been made to move forward a skirmish-line, but that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in position."