The Austrians far surpassed their adversaries in the skill and effectiveness with which they used their artillery. The superiority of the French artillery had largely contributed to the Austrian disasters in Italy seven years before, and the lesson had not been forgotten. From the beginning of the Campaign of 1866, the Austrian artillery was an important factor in every engagement, and at Königgrätz it was handled superbly. But, in every case, it was used defensively, and the Austrian artillerists originated no new tactical features, and taught no lessons that could not have been learned from Gettysburg, Malvern Hill, Solferino, or even Wagram. * * * * * The concentration of the Prussian armies preparatory to hostilities was made partly by marching, and partly by railroad transportation. The work accomplished by the railroads may, perhaps, be best expressed in the words of the Prussian Staff History: “The whole of the marches and of the railway movements were so arranged by the General Staff, in harmony with the railway department, that in their execution, in which both the military and civil powers were concerned, no impediments or delays could occur. The result of these arrangements was, that in the twenty-one days allowed, 197,000 men, 55,000 horses, and 5,300 wagons were transported for distances varying between 120 and 300 miles, without any failure, and in such a manner that they attained the required spots at the very hour requisite.” Prussia was thus enabled, in the short space of three weeks, to place 325,000 men on the hostile frontiers, of which number 267,000 were ready for operations against Austria. Yet, great as this achievement was, it shows that the Prussian military system had not yet reached the perfection shown in 1870, when nineteen days sufficed for the mobilization of an army of 440,000 Germans, and its concentration on the frontier of France. Further than in the matter of mobilization and concentration, the use of railways in the Austro-Prussian war presented no new features. In the matter of supplying armies in the field, the small area of the theater of war, and the inertness of the cavalry, were such that it is almost impossible to make a comparison of the use of railways in this campaign with the use of the same means of transport in the War of Secession. If we imagine a Prussian army pushing entirely through the Austrian Empire, to the vicinity of Belgrade, and dependent for its supplies on a single line of railway, back to a base on the Prussian frontier; and if we imagine, moreover, that the Austrian cavalry possessed vigilance, enterprise, good firearms and modern ideas, instead of being a mere military anachronism, we can picture a parallel to Sherman’s Atlanta campaign. * * * * *