By occupying all the valleys, roads, and prominent points in the theatre of operations, the Austrians expected to hold military possession of the country. Their system of war was to form a chain of posts--a cordon--along the line to be occupied; and by this means they expected to prevent the advance of the enemy. Thus the Austrian army was scattered over a great extent of country from the Tyrol to Lake Constance, thence through the Black Forest to the Main River. Their line was more than three hundred miles in extent. Kray had extended his right wing as far north as Mayence, in order to protect the troops in the Black Forest from a French attack on that side. Since Moreau held the line of the Rhine, possibly he might attempt to cross at Mayence, thence, using the Main River to screen his movements, might march to Wurtzburg, and from that point march south on Ulm. By such a manoeuvre, he could sever Kray's communications, take the Austrians in rear in the Black Forest, and compel them to fight with their face towards Vienna, in order to recover their communications. But, in order to protect himself on this side, Kray had extended Starray's corps too far north; it consisted of but sixteen thousand soldiers, and was so scattered from Mayence to Renchen, a distance of one hundred miles, that it was weak at all points. Moreover, it was so far distant from the main Austrian forces in the Black Forest that it could neither readily aid them in case they should be attacked in force, nor be readily aided by them should Moreau attempt to make a flank movement against the Austrian right. But a greater fault in the situation of the Austrian army was due to the fact that the Aulic Council had given orders that Kray's left wing, under the Prince de Reuss, should remain on the borders of eastern Switzerland and in the Tyrol. This wing could not, therefore, re-enforce Kray in the Black Forest. With his left thus paralyzed by the action of the Aulic Council, Kray found himself hampered throughout the campaign. Kray committed another error in collecting immense magazines at Stokach; for this place, being but a day's march from the French forces in Switzerland, was not only the most vulnerable but also the most important point occupied by the Austrians. Lying in a gap between Lake Constance and the mountains of Switzerland on one side, and the Black Forest on the other, and being on the direct road from Schaffhausen to Ulm, it was, so to speak, the vital point of the long Austrian line. Along this route the French would be most likely to advance into Germany; for they could ascend the Rhine by the river roads, thence proceed to Stokach, and thus avoid the great natural barrier of the Black Forest. Moreover, by adopting this plan there were great strategical advantages to be gained.